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MODERN PUBLIC TRUST PRINCIPLES:
RECOGNIZING RIGHTS AND
INTEGRATING STANDARDS
Alexandra B. Klass*
INTRODUCTION
Throughout its existence, the public trust doctrine has been pul-
led in different directions and assigned different meanings. At its
core, the public trust doctrine is the idea that there are some re-
sources, notably tidal and navigable waters and the lands under them
that are forever subject to state ownership and protection in trust for
the use and benefit of the public. To some, the doctrine is a vehicle
for public access to water, beaches, or fishing in a world otherwise
dominated by private ownership. To others it is a check on govern-
ment attempts to give away or sell such resources for short-term eco-
nomic gain. To yet others, it is a back-door mechanism for judicial
taking of private property without just compensation through a clever
argument that the property was never "private" in the first place. In
general, however, it has been lauded as a doctrine full of potential for
environmental and natural resources protection, but also has been
subject to significant criticism since its resurgence in its modern form
in the 1970s.
Criticisms of the modern public trust doctrine include that it is
an anachronistic, property-based doctrine that prevents a rethinking
of how humans relate to the world from a holistic or ecological per-
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spective;I that it places emphasis on the judiciary and the common law
rather than on more powerful and comprehensive legislative efforts to
protect the environment;2 or that it is a doctrine devoid of standards
that encourages judicial takings of private property without just corn-
pensation. - As William Rodgers stated in the 1980s, ten years after the
modern doctrine burst on the scene, "It is a doctrine with both a radi-
cal potential and indifferent prospects. ' 4 Regardless of its alleged
problems and limitations, this historic and amorphous doctrine con-
tinues to be studied by students and scholars of property law, constitu-
tional law, environmental law, natural resources law, and public lands
law.
The purpose of this Article is to create a new theoretical frame-
work for a modern public trust doctrine grounded in state common
law that can be used broadly for environmental protection purposes
and is responsive to the various criticisms of the doctrine set out
above. Most scholarly treatment of the public trust doctrine has ex-
plored the doctrine only in its common law form, or in its manifesta-
1 See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Our Better Natures: A Revisionist View of Joseph Sax's
Public Trust Theory of Environsnental Protection, and Some Dark Thoughts on the Possibility of
Law Reform, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1209, 1212-18 (1991) (arguing that the public trust
doctrine is a wrong or flawed solution to the nation's environmental crisis and has
impaired the development of more ambitious reform movements).
2 See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in
Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REv. 631, 656-715
(1986) (arguing that by being based on a private property rights conception of natu-
ral resources law, the public trust doctrine is an anachronism which impedes more
progressive legislative developments to protect natural resources and the
environment).
3 See, e.g., James L. Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a
Constitutional Democracy, 19 ENVrL. L. 527, 565-68 (1989) (arguing that the public
trust doctrine is an unworkable doctrine and is incompatible with the values of a
constitutional democracy); George P. Smith II & Michael W. Sweeney, The Public Trust
Doctrine and Natural Law: Emanations Within a Penumbra, 33 B.C. ENVTL. Arr. L. REV.
307, 322-41 (2006) (arguing that expansion of the public trust doctrine to protect
modern environmental protection needs not grounded in natural law traditions
would unreasonably interfere with private property rights and result in improper judi-
cial activism); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REv. 1449 (1990)
(arguing that judicial changes in the law impacting private property rights should not
be immune from a takings analysis); see also Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S.
1207, 1212 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia dissented from the Court's
denial of certiorari in this Oregon case denying development rights to owners of cer-
tain dry sand beaches because of the public's interest in those beaches. He argued
that "[nijo more by judicial decree than by legislative fiat may a State transform pri-
vate property into public property without compensation." Id.
4 1 WILLIAM H. RODGERS,JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER § 2.20, at 155
(1986).
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tion in state constitutions, or in the statutory forms that 
exist in some
states. By contrast, the proposal set forth here 
refuses to look at the
common law public trust doctrine separate and 
apart from state con-
stitutional and statutory provisions expressly incorporating 
the doc-
trine, as well as the numerous and powerful 
state and federal
environmental and natural resources protection 
laws. This proposal
draws on recent developments in the state courts 
and attempts to de-
velop a coherent framework states can adopt 
to both recognize envi-
ronmental rights and provide substantive 
standards for applying the
public trust doctrine today.
Under this new approach, there need not 
be a struggle between
common law public trust principles on the 
one hand or strong envi-
ronmental statutes and regulations on the 
other-it is not an "either-
or" proposition. Instead, this framework integrates 
public trust princi-
ples in all of its forms, allowing the common 
law doctrine and legisla-
tively enacted environmental protection 
provisions to be mutually
reinforcing and, thus, more powerful. Moreover, 
by grounding the
doctrine in state law, rather than a confusing 
mix of state and federal
common law, the doctrine avoids the criticism 
that it is based on an
outdated, pre-"Erie doctrine" view of federal 
common law. Through-
out this Article I will make reference to 
"public trust principles" to
stand for this new and consolidated framework 
for natural resources
protection that courts can use to develop 
their own state public trust
doctrine.
A reorientation of the public trust doctrine 
is particularly timely
now when, just in the past few years, there have been new 
and signifi-
cant shifts in ideas by the government and 
the public regarding the
scope of private property rights, the role of government 
regulation,
and the relationship between the state and 
federal governments in
protecting natural resources and the environment. 
In such times, fa-
miliar methods of addressing longstanding 
issues of economic devel-
opment, private property, constitutional 
law, and resource
conservation are being called into question. Indeed, 
in recent years,
the environmental regulatory state that has 
been building since the
1970s often seems unable to even begin to 
address current issues of
global warming, energy needs, water pollution, 
and preservation of
species and open space. As a result, there 
has been a renewed focus
on state law, including state common law, 
and modern public trust
principles should be part of that focus.
Part I provides a very brief history of the common 
law public trust
doctrine with a focus on its use and implementation 
after it was revi-
talized for environmental protection purposes 
following Joseph Sax's
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influential law review article on the topic in 1970.5 This Part looks not
only at the doctrine's modern common law scope, but how the doc-
trine has been integrated into many states' constitutions and statutory
law beginning in the 1970s. Part II reviews recent case law that has
made efforts to integrate developments in the common law public
trust doctrine, state and federal statutes, and state constitutions in or-
der to support decisions protecting natural resources where any one
of those legal doctrines on their own might be insufficient. Part III
explains the significance of these judicial developments in today's
world and presents a framework grounded in state law to expand and
strengthen this holistic and mutually reinforcing public trust ap-
proach to protect and preserve natural resources and the
environment.
I. HISTORIC ORIGINS AND MODERN CONCEPTIONS
The common law public trust doctrine is often described as elu-
sive or vague as a result of its ancient and diffuse origins and varia-
tions in scope among the states. 6 Briefly though, the idea behind the
public trust doctrine is that while private ownership of land and re-
sources dominates American property law, there are some resources,
notably navigable and tidal waters and the lands under them that are
forever subject to state ownership and protection in trust for the use
and benefit of the public. 7 Although the origins of the doctrine may
be in some dispute, most scholars trace it back to Roman and English
law, which held that property rights in the rivers, seas and seashore
were to be preserved for the benefit of the public for navigation, fish-
ing or other purposes.8 In other words, unlike other types of public
property, such lands could never be granted or sold into private
ownership .9
5 See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471 (1970).
6 See RODGERS, supra note 4, § 2.20, at 155-56 (stating that the public trust doc-
trine is "resoundingly vague, obscure in origin and uncertain of purpose" and that "its
theoretical underpinnings have not been adequately clarified"); Carol M. Rose, Joseph
Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 EcOLOGY L.Q. 351, 355-56 (1998) (stating that
although the "general concept" of the public trust was "widely cited" in cases and
scholarship, "the doctrine itself remained vague").
7 RODGFRS, supra note 4, § 2.20, at 158-59; Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W.
Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois
Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799, 800 (2004).
8 See, e.g., Lazarus supra note 2, at 633-35.
9 SeeJOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT 163-65 (Alfred A. Knopf ed.,
1970) (discussing origins of American public trust doctrine in Roman and English
law); Lazarus, supra note 2, at 633-35; Sax, supra note 5, at 475-76. In Justinian's
(VOL. 82:2
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As applied in the United States, the Supreme Court held in the
1840s that the original colonies succeeded to the English crown the
ownership of submerged lands under tidal waters and that after inde-
pendence, the newly formed state governments held tide to such
lands.' The Court also held that states later admitted to the Union
obtained the same ownership rights to submerged lands under tidal
waters as the original thirteen states under the "equal footing"
doctrine .1
With this significant ownership granted to states came limitations
as well. First, under the Commerce Clause, Congress had express au-
thority to regulate those navigable waterways subject to state owner-
ship and exercise a "navigational servitude" over such waters without
paying compensation.12 Second, and more significantly, the Supreme
Court confirmed in 1892 in the significant case of Illinois Central Rail-
road Co. v. Illinois,13 that the historic public trust doctrine was an inde-
pendent limitation on the state's power to sell or otherwise relinquish
control over submerged lands that instead must always be held "in
trust" for the public. 14
Illinois Central involved state legislation in 1869 which granted to
the Illinois Central Railroad more than 1000 acres along the shores of
Lake Michigan in the Chicago Harbor, extending for a mile out from
compendium of Roman law, he declared as part of natural law that there were com-
munal rights in the air, running water, the sea and the shores of the sea. See Lazarus,
supra note 2, at 633-34.
10 See Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367,416-17 (1842); Kearney& Merrill,
supra note 7, at 828.
11 See Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 229 (1845) (holding that the state-
hood clause of the U.S. Constitution, Article IV, Section 3, Clause 1, required that
new states enter the Union on grounds of full political equality with the other states);
see also Kearney & Merrill, supra note 7, at 823-33 (discussing history of state owner-
ship of lands under tidal and navigable-in-fact waters); Charles F. Wilkinson, The
Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Scope and Source of the Traditional
Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 443-47 (1989) (discussing the "equal footing" doctrine and
its origins).
12 See United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 124 (1967); United States v. Twin City
Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 227 (1956); Wilkinson, supra note 11, at 449-50 (citing
United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913)) (denying
compensation for lost power-generating value of hydroelectric site taken under con-
demnation by Congress); see also Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 271-72 (1897)
(finding that although the state holds title to navigable waters and lands underlying
them, such title is subject to a federal navigational servitude for the purpose of regu-
lating and improving navigation); Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 64 n.7 (Mich.
2005) (same).
13 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
14 Id. at 452.
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the coast and for a mile in length across the city's central business
district.' 5 A few years later, the state had a change of heart, revoked
the earlier grant, and brought a lawsuit to have the original grant de-
clared invalid. The Supreme Court upheld the state's claim on
grounds that the original grant of submerged lands was invalid under
the public trust doctrine.' 6
The Court confirmed that the state held title to the submerged
lands in Lake Michigan,1 7 but also held that the title was "different in
character" from other state lands which could be sold into private
ownership."' Although the Court acknowledged that it could not cite
any authority where a grant like this had been held invalid, it stated
that there were numerous decisions stating that such property is held
by the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, in trust for the public. As a
result, the state's control of such lands, for purposes of the trust, "can
never be lost," unless conveyed for uses promoting the interest of the
public.1 9 The Court went on to recognize that the Chicago Harbor
was of significant value to the people of Illinois, and was to be held in
trust for them so they could enjoy navigation, carry on commerce and
enjoy the liberty of fishing free from obstruction or interference by
private parties. 20
The Court was not at all clear regarding the legal basis for this
restriction on state power and subsequent Court opinions have not
provided additional clarity.21 Some scholars have proposed that the
public trust doctrine is a product of congressional preemption result-
ing from a comprehensive program to keep the major watercourses
free for navigation, or constitutionally founded in the Commerce
Clause. 22 Others have argued it may be grounded in the Due Process
15 Id. at 433-44, 54; SAx, supra note 9, at 170-71.
16 Illinois Cent., 146 U.S. at 454. For a detailed history of the facts of the Illinois
Central case, see Kearney & Merrill, supra note 7.
17 The Court held expressly that the submerged lands to which the state automat-
ically held title were not limited to tidelands but also include the Great Lakes and
other major inland waterbodies. Illinois Cent., 146 U.S. at 435-37.
18 Id. at 452.
19 Id. at 453.
20 Id. at 452, 454.
21 See, e.g., Kearney & Merrill, supra note 7, at 803, 928-29 (referring to ambigui-
ties in the Illinois Centralopinion on the source of the public trust doctrine in state or
federal law).
22 See Wilkinson, supra note 11, at 445-46. Wilkinson also raised the possibility
that the doctrine could be based either on federal common law or the Guarantee
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, but rejected those possibilities on grounds that it was
unlikely a modern court would employ either basis to support the doctrine. Id.
[VOL. 82:2
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or Equal Protection Clauses. 23 The Court in Illinois Central was also
elusive as to whether state law or federal law defined the scope of the
trust and whether it was in any way based on federal common law.
Indeed, it was perhaps less crucial that the Court define the precise
basis for its holding because the case predated its 1938 decision in Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, where the Court held that " [t here is no fed-
eral general common law." 24 Illinois Central certainly implies that fed-
eral law governs in the sense that that Illinois or any other state
cannot override trust obligations by statute. 25 However, in 1988, in
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,26 the Supreme Court held that each
state could decide how broadly it wished to define its trust lands, even
in the face of competing private property interests.27 Significantly, no
state court has attempted to do away entirely with the public trust doc-
trine within its borders, the Supreme Court has never indicated that a
state would have a right to do so,28 and at least one state court has
invalidated legislative attempts to do so. 2 9 Thus, one can consider the
doctrine as containing a federal prohibition on any state efforts to
abrogate the doctrine entirely, but allowing states a wide berth to ex-
pand the doctrine's protection beyond a federal minimum.30
Putting aside its legal groundings, Illinois Central stands as an
early invocation of the public trust doctrine to prevent a state from
placing public trust lands into private hands for short-term economic
gain to the detriment of the long-term preservation of the resource
for the public. As Joseph Sax detailed in his groundbreaking 1970 law
review article,31 courts in several states prior to 1970 had relied on
some version of public trust principles to prevent states from compro-
mising public trust resources in the name of economic development
or to benefit private interests.32 Based on this authority, Sax argued
23 See Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO. J. 411, 426-28 (1987).
24 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
25 See Illinois Cent., 146 U.S. at 453, 455 (making broad references to "the State"
and that "[a]ny grant of the kind is necessarily revocable"); Wilkinson, supra note 11,
at 460.
26 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
27 Id. at 475-76, 482-83.
28 See Wilkinson; supra note 11, at 463-64.
29 See San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 972 P.2d 179, 199 (Ariz. 1999)
(holding as a matter of state constitutional law that a state cannot abrogate the public
trust doctrine by statute); infra notes 180-83 and accompanying text.
30 Wilkinson, supra note 11, at 464.
31 See Sax, supra note 5.
32 See id. at 491-546 (citing, e.g., Robbins v. Dep't of Pub. Works, 244 N.E.2d 577,
578-580 (Mass. 1969) (invalidating statute authorizing transfer of wetlands "of consid-
erable beauty" that were "often used for nature study and recreation" to public works
2oo6]
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that the public trust doctrine as implemented by the judiciary had the
potential to become a powerful mechanism to protect the public in-
terest in access, navigation, and recreation against state action that
would attempt to privatize or limit those resources.33 In doing so, Sax
summarized the doctrine as applying where there was a legal right
vested in the public, the right was enforceable against the govern-
ment, and the substance of the right was harmonious with environ-
mental concerns. 34
More importantly, Sax argued that although the doctrine had his-
torically been limited to lands underlying navigable waters and situa-
tions involving state action that would convey or destroy those lands,
"the judicial techniques developed in public trust cases need not be
limited either to these few conventional interests or to questions of
disposition of public properties."35 Instead, Sax posited that the mix-
ture of procedural and substantive protection applied in traditional
public trust cases would be equally applicable in cases involving air
pollution, pesticides, strip mining, utility rights of way, or wetland fill-
ing on private land that requires a permit.3 6
Sax's article became a significant force that converged with other
political and social developments in the 1960s and early 1970s to es-
tablish the modern field of environmental law and completely trans-
form how the government and the public responded to issues of
natural resources, conservation, environmental protection and eco-
nomic development.3 7 Moreover, since 1970, court decisions have re-
department for highway development); Sacco v. Dep't of Pub. Works, 227 N.E.2d 478,
480-81 (Mass. 1967) (invalidating legislation authorizing filling of pond for highway
construction); Gould v. Greylock, 215 N.E.2d 114 (Mass. 1966) (invalidating state
lease and management agreement issued to private party to create commercial devel-
opment on 4,000 acres in public park); In re Crawford County Levee & Drainage Dist.
No. 1, 196 N.W. 874, 877-78 (Wis. 1924) (invalidating action to drain wetlands); In re
Trempeleau Drainage Dist., 131 N.W. 838, 841-42 (Wis. 1911) (invalidating state ac-
tion taken to drain swamplands); Priewe v. Wis. State Land & Improvement Co., 67
N.W. 918, 922 (Wis. 1896) (invalidating legislation authorizing a private individual to
drain a lake)).
33 Sax, supra note 5, at 475.
34 See Lazarus, supra note 2, at 642 (summarizing Sax's views of the doctrine);
Sax, supra note 5, at 491-531.
35 Sax, supra note 5, at 556.
36 Id. at 557. Sax discussed many of these issues in more detail in his book Defend-
ing the Environment, also published in 1970. See SAX, supra note 9.
37 See Delgado, supra note 1, at 1210. Delgado suggests that the time was "exactly
right" for Sax's article in light of the growing environmental movement and efforts of
scholars, activists and ordinary citizens calling "for greater attention to the problems
of decreasing quality of life, increasing pollution, and overdevelopment of the na-
tion's farm and wilderness lands." Id.; see also Peter Manus, To the Candidate in Search
[VOL. 82:2
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flected a growing awareness of environmental issues in developing the
public trust doctrine as a matter of common law, while state legisla-
tures have acted in kind by adopting state environmental protection
provisions in their state constitutions and statutes often based ex-
pressly on public trust principles. A brief review of this common law,
constitutional and statutory history follows. This review sets the stage
for the analysis in Parts II and III, which creates a framework to inte-
grate the developments in each of these areas.
A. Common Law Developments
Since Sax's article in 1970, courts have decided hundreds of cases
involving the public trust doctrine and cited Sax's article in many of
them.3 8 These cases include not only private parties suing the govern-
ment for allegedly breaching public trust duties (the most common
situation in cases prior to 1970), but also private parties suing other
private parties and the government suing private parties. 39 Not only
have the types of actions under the doctrine expanded but the reach
of the doctrine itself has expanded.
In certain states, courts have expanded the doctrine from its his-
toric domain of ensuring public access to navigable waters to protect-
ing use, access to, and preservation of all waters usable for
of a Theme: Promote the Public Trust, 19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 315, 331 (2000) ("Sax articu-
lated his public trust thesis at a moment in history-perhaps the only moment in
modern American history-when it appeared that the country's political and legal
institutions might fully embrace environmental values."); Rose, supra note 6, at
353-54 (placing Sax's article in the context of the beginning of modem environ-
mentalism); see also ZvGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
1065-66, 1068 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing the impact of modem public trust doctrine
on statutory protection of endangered species, air quality, water quality, as well as all
settings where human actors threaten to destroy public trust resources, the state at-
tempts to sell public trust resources, or governments attempt to exploit public trust
resources); Delgado, supra note 1, at 1213 (recognizing Sax's influence on federal
environmental statutes); Manus, supra, at 331 (same).
38 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 37, at 1073 (stating that Sax's article has been
cited extensively and can claim the majority of credit for the active presence of the
public trust doctrine in U.S. environmental law); Michael C. Blumm & Lucas Ritchie,
Lucas's Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses,
29 HARv. ENVrL. L. REv. 321, 341-42 & n.125 (2005) (noting that Sax's article had
been cited in at least thirty-three judicial opinions by 1989 and in six additional opin-
ions by 2005); Lazarus, supra note 2, at 644 (stating that between 1970 and 1985, in
half of the states, approximately 100 cases were reported involving the public trust
doctrine, many of which cite Sax's article).
39 See Lazarus, supra note 2, at 645-46 & n.79 (collecting cases).
2006]
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recreational purposes,40 the dry sand area of beaches for public recre-
ation purposes, 41 parklands, 42 wildlife and wildlife habitat connected
to navigable waters, 43 drinking water resources, 44 and inland wet-
lands.45 Courts have also used the doctrine to resolve water appropri-
ation issues and have held that even preexisting water rights may be
curtailed if necessary to prevent reduction of water in inland streams
or lakes that provide aesthetic values or habitats for animal and plant
species or other natural resources. 46
These more recent public trust decisions show how the environ-
mental movement of the 1970s began to influence state courts' con-
ceptions of the role of the common law public trust doctrine in our
modern world. Indeed, the supreme courts of California, Wisconsin
and Illinois and lower courts in other jurisdictions issued strong pub-
lic trust opinions in the 1970s that expressly recognized society's grow-
ing concern regarding environmental issues and the need for
common law legal doctrines to evolve to meet those needs.
For instance, in 1972 in Just v. Marinette County,47 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held that a shoreland zoning ordinance prohibiting
40 See Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont. 1984)
(extending public trust doctrine to all waters capable of recreational use by the
public).
41 See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 363-66 (N.J.
1984) (explaining that the public trust doctrine requires public access to dry sand
beaches between high water mark and vegetation line in both public or quasi-public
ownership).
42 See Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm'n, 263 N.E.2d 11, 15 (I1. 1970) (stating that
the public trust applies to parkland); Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. New York, 750
N.E.2d 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 2001) (noting that the common law public trust doctrine in
New York extends to parkland and such land cannot be alienated without express
legislative authorization).
43 See Pullen v. Ullmer, 923 P.2d 54, 61 (Alaska 1996) (holding that the doctrine
applies to salmon and other fish); Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971)
(holding that trust purposes are broader than traditional uses of navigation, com-
merce and fishing and include use as open space, for wildlife habitat, scientific study
and swimming).
44 Mayor v. Passaic Valley Water Comm'n, 539 A.2d 760, 765 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1987) (stating that the public trust doctrine applies to drinking water resources).
45 SeeJust v. Mainette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 769 (Wis. 1972); Lazarus, supra
note 2, at 649-50.
46 See, e.g., CWC Fisheries v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115, 1121 (Alaska 1988); Nat'l
Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 727-28 (Cal. 1983); In reWai'ola 0
Moloka'i, Inc., 83 P.3d 664, 710 (Haw. 2004); Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441, 450
(Idaho 1985); United Plainsmen Ass'n v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comm'n,
247 N.W.2d 457, 463 (N.D. 1976); Wilkinson, supra note 11, at 465-66 (discussing
court decisions since 1970 extending the doctrine beyond its historic origins).
47 201 N.W.2d 761.
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landowners from filling wetlands abutting navigable 
waters was not a
taking subject to compensation. 48 In reaching its decision, 
the court
framed the issue as "a conflict between the public 
interest in stopping
the despoliation of natural resources, which our citizens 
until recently
have taken as inevitable and for granted, and 
an owner's asserted
right to use his property as he wishes."
49 The court further stated that
while swamps and wetlands were once considered 
"wasteland, undesir-
able, and not picturesque," as people have 
become "more sophisti-
cated" they now appreciate that swamps and 
wetlands "serve a vital
role in nature, are part of the balance of nature 
and are essential to
the purity of the water in our lakes and streams.
' 50 The court contin-
ued by stating that "wetlands are a necessary 
part of the ecological
creation and now, even to the uninitiated, possess 
their own beauty in
nature.
'
"51
The court concluded that the state's "active public 
trust duty" re-
specting navigable waters required the state to 
not only promote navi-
gation but also preserve and protect those waters 
for fishing,
recreation, and scenic beauty.
52 Because these background trust prin-
ciples were an inherent limitation on the landowner's 
property rights,
the ordinance preventing the fill did not "improve 
the public condi-
tion" but instead "preserves nature from the 
despoilage and harm re-
sulting from the unrestricted activities 
of humans."-'5
3
A New York state court expressed a similar sentiment 
in 1972 in
Smithtown v. Poveromo,
54 where the court provided a historical sum-
mary of the public trust doctrine and stated 
that the entire ecological
system supporting the waterways was an integral 
part of those water-
ways and must be included within the 
purview of the trust.
55 The
court continued by stressing the existence of 
new knowledge on the
useful functions wetlands perform such as acting 
as a buffer against
potentially dangerous waters, as a filtering system 
of the incoming
tide, as a base for the marine food chain, and 
as a nesting ground for
birds and other endangered species.
56
48 Id. at 772.
49 Id. at 767.
50 Id. at 768.
51 !d.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 771.
54 336 N.Y.S.2d 764 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1972), rev'd 
on other grounds, 359 N.Y.S.2d 848
(N.Y. App. Div. 1973).
55 Id. at 775.
56 Id.
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Likewise, in 1971, the California Supreme Court held in Marks v.
Whitney,5 7 that a private owner of tidelands did not have the right to
fill the tidelands as a result of the public trust doctrine. The court
noted that the matter was of great importance because of population
pressures, demands for recreational property, and the increasing de-
velopment of seashore and waterfront property,5 The court stated
that although the public trust doctrine historically was defined in
terms of navigation, commerce and fisheries, the doctrine was "suffi-
ciently flexible" to encompass changing public needs.5 9 The court
went on to note that there was a growing recognition that one of the
most important uses of tidelands is preservation of those lands in their
natural state, to serve as ecological units for scientific study, as open
space, and to support environments which provide food and habitat
for birds and marine life.60
Finally, in 1977, the Illinois Supreme Court held in Scott v. Chi-
cago Park District,61 that a state senate bill conveying nearly 200 acres
under Lake Michigan to a steel company was void under the public
trust doctrine. The court recognized that the industrial plant to be
built would create public benefits in the form ofjobs and an improved
economy, but that the state could not satisfy its public trust doctrine
obligations through such economic benefits. 62 As a counterweight to
the economic public benefit, the court focused on the fact that Lake
Michigan is a valuable natural resource that belongs to the people of
the state, and that "there has developed a strong, though belated in-
terest in conserving natural resources and in protecting and improv-
ing our physical environment."63
These cases from the 1970s show at least some state courts recog-
nizing the nation's awakening to environmental issues and incorporat-
ing those principles into public trust decisions in a major way. This
phenomenon did not end with the 1970s.6 4 In 1983, the California
Supreme Court in the famous "Mono Lake" case held that the public
trust doctrine applied to inland, navigable lakes and required the state
to take into account ecological and aesthetic interests in making water
allocation decisions even where state statutes did not appear to allow
57 491 P.2d 374, 378 (Cal. 1971).
58 Id. at 378.
59 Id. at 380.
60 Id.
61 360 N.E.2d 773 (111. 1977).
62 id. at 781.
63 Id. at 780.
64 Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
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consideration of such concerns. 65 In reaching its holding, the court
stated that Mono Lake was "a scenic and ecological treasure of na-
tional significance, imperiled by continued diversion of water," and
that the state's public trust values required those concerns to be inte-
grated into the state's water appropriation scheme. 66 The court's de-
cision detailed the lake's steadily increasing salinity which would
adversely impact the food chain, millions of local and migratory birds
using the lake, and the lake's value as an aesthetic, recreational and
scientific resource. 67
In 1998, the New York Supreme Court held that a state law re-
stricting development in a natural area of Long Island was not an un-
constitutional taking of private property without just compensation. 6
The court began its discussion in a manner nearly identical to the
Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion in Just, by stating that the case
was "a clash between two dynamic impulses, the collective right to pre-
serve natural resources and the individual right of property."69 In
holding that the public trust doctrine limited the plaintiff's property
rights so as to render the law not a taking, the court provided a history
of the public trust doctrine and argued that the early common law in
England and America spoke to the subject of environmental regula-
tion, and provided a common law custom that supported the law in
question.70 In response to the plaintiffs' contention that development
would not result in environmental harm, the court looked back all the
way to Roman law for the proposition that the "conservation of re-
sources is intrinsically good and necessary for the continuation of soci-
ety."71 Thus, the court concluded that in enacting environmental
laws, the government was simply meeting its obligation to preserve
resources for future generations.72
In 2004, the Louisiana Supreme Court expressly recognized envi-
ronmental protection values in finding that a diversion project that
65 Id. at 727-28.
66 Id. at 712.
67 Id. at 715-16.
68 W.J.F. Realty Corp. v. State, 672 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
69 Id. at 1007.
70 Id. at 1009.
71 Id. at 1012; see also Glisson v. City of Marion, 720 N.E.2d 1034, 1045-47 (111.
1999) (Harrison J., dissenting). In Glisson, the dissent argued for citizen standing to
challenge a dam on a creek that would impact endangered species, focusing on the
"well-documented importance of biodiversity to human welfare," and concluded that
"[wle protect threatened and endangered species because, in doing so, we protect
ourselves and the welfare of Illinoisans who will inherit this land when we are gone."
Id. at 1046.
72 WJF Realty, 672 N.Y.S.2d at 1011-12.
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would impact private interests in oyster beds was not 
a taking based in
part on the common law public trust doctrine.
73 The court stated that
the implementation of the project "fits precisely within the public
trust doctrine" because the public resource at issue 
"is our very coast-
line, the loss of which is occurring at an alarming 
rate. '74 The court
went on to describe the threat to the resource as 
"not just environ-
mental" but also the health, safety, and welfare 
of the people as
coastal erosion removes an important barrier between 
large popula-
tions and hurricanes and storms.
75 The court warned that left un-
checked this erosion would result in the loss 
of land, jobs and
corridors critical to businesses that rely on the coastal 
region for trans-
portation. 76 Thus the court held that the interference 
with oyster
beds must be allowed under the public trust doctrine 
to address ero-
sion concers. 7 7 The court's fears, of course, 
were later born out by
the massive disaster resulting from Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005.78
These cases provide only a few recent examples 
of state courts
incorporating environmental values into their discussions 
of the com-
mon law public doctrine as a matter of state law, 
and using the doc-
trine to ensure that public trust resources 
are protected and
preserved. However, despite the fact that at least 
some courts have
been able to incorporate contemporary environmental 
values into the
common law public trust doctrine, the critics are 
correct that the com-
mon law doctrine on its own remains limited. First, very 
few, if any,
courts have extended the common law doctrine beyond 
tidal or navi-
gable waters, thus leaving unprotected inland resources 
that are un-
connected to navigable lakes or rivers.
79
73 Avenal v. State, 886 So. 2d 1085, 1101-02, 1109-10 
(La. 2004).
74 Id. at 1101.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 1101-02.
77 Id. at 1102; see also Parker v. New Hanover 
County, 619 S.E.2d 868, 875-76
(N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that special assessment for inlet 
relocation project was
not unconstitutional based in part on the public 
trust doctrine and noting the impor-
tance of North Carolina's coastal areas and 
the concerns related to recent
hurricanes).
78 See, e.g., Oliver Houck, Can We Save New Orleans?, 
19 TUL. ENvTrL. L.J. 1 (2006)
(discussing impact of historic development and erosion as 
part of the physical chal-
lenges facing New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina); John 
P. Manard et al., Katrina's
Tort Litigation: An Imperfect Storm, 20 NAT. RESOURCRS & ENV'T 
31, 31-32, 36 (2006)
(discussing artificial modifications of natural barriers in Louisiana 
and destruction of
protective marshland and wetlands for development).
79 See, e.g., RODGERS, supra note 4, § 2.20, at 158-60 
(stating that "for the time
being, the public trust doctrine remains confined 
restlessly" to submerged lands, the
foreshore and other navigable waters).
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More important, relying exclusively on the common law as the
primary mechanism to protect natural resources and the environment
(whether in the form of the public trust doctrine or in the form of
more familiar doctrines such as nuisance or negligence) has always
had limitations which still exist today. As a general matter, the com-
mon law tends to operate retrospectively rather than prospectively; it
is sporadic and case-specific; it develops slowly in multiple jurisdic-
tions, making a national and more immediate solution to a problem
nearly impossible; it must abide by common law burdens of proof and
is administered by judges who often lack specialized or scientific ex-
pertise in the area.80 These limitations of common law generally are
exacerbated in the public trust area where, unlike doctrines of nui-
sance or negligence that exist in virtually every state jurisdiction, the
public trust doctrine is hardly recognized or used in many jurisdic-
tions. For instance, the common law doctrine has never been used for
environmental protection purposes in Minnesota, a state otherwise
historically known for its progressive environmental protection
policies.8'
As a result, the common law public trust doctrine is clearly no-
where near a global solution to advancing protection for natural re-
sources and the environment, whether threatened by state action or
private action. However, the public trust doctrine can still play an im-
portant role in ensuring judicial review of actions that threaten natu-
ral resources and the environment where an environmental statute
does not apply or is not being enforced, or where state constitutional
provisions to protect natural resources do not exist or are ineffective.
In the cases described in this subpart, the public trust doctrine was
often available as a last resort for judicial review where there was sim-
ply no other statutory law, constitutional law or common law available
for relief. Thus, to the extent the common law public trust doctrine
can provide support to or be supported by environmental policies in
80 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 37, at 283-84.
81 A Westlaw search of "public trust doctrine" in Minnesota gives a result of only
one case applying the doctrine under Minnesota law, and in that case, the court
found that the doctrine applied only to navigable waterways and did not extend to
state parkland. Larson v. Sando, 508 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (finding
that the public trust doctrine did not prevent department of natural resources from
selling state land that had been designated as a wildlife management area to a private
party). As noted below, while Minnesota courts have rarely discussed the common
law public trust doctrine, they have interpreted expansively the Minnesota Environ-
mental Rights Act, MLNN. STAT. §§ 1161.01-.13 (2004), which is based on public trust
principles.
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state statutes or constitutions, the doctrine will be in a position to play
a more important role in state environmental protection 
efforts.
B. State Constitutional Developments: Empty Rhetoric or
Aspirational Guidance?
The environmental movement of the 1970s and Sax's 
article led
not only to a resurgence in use of the common law 
public trust doc-
trine to protect natural resources and the environment 
but also to
efforts to amend state constitutions to codify the public 
trust doctrine
or create new constitutional rights to a clean or 
healthful environ-
ment.8 2 Indeed, all state constitutions drafted since 
1959 address en-
vironmental and natural resources preservation issues, 
and several
states with constitutions enacted prior to that date 
have amended
their constitutions to address environmental issues,
8 3 resulting in
forty-two states with constitutions that at least mention 
environmental
protection or natural resources.
8 4 While some state constitutional
provisions do no more than authorize the legislature 
to enact environ-
mental laws (which it already has authority to do under its inherent
police power), others codify the common law public trust doctrine 
or
set out a constitutional policy to protect the environment. 
Yet others
grant rights to all citizens for a "clean and healthful 
environment" or
place mandatory duties on the state to 
protect the environment.
8 5
82 See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, The Metrics of Constitutional Amendments: 
And Why Proposed
Environmental Quality Amendments Don't Measure Up, 74 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 245, 247
(1999) ("[Environmental quality amendments] first surfaced 
at the national level in
the late 1960s and had their heyday in the early 1970s, 
on the coat-tails of the environ-
mentalism euphoria that culminated in the first Earth 
Day.").
83 See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Constitutionalizing 
the Environment: The History and
Future of Montana's Environmental Provisions, 64 MONT. L. REv. 157, 
160 (2003).
84 See RobertJ. Klee, What's Good for School Finance Should be Good 
for Environmental
Justice: Addressing Disparate Environmental Impacts Using 
State Courts and Constitutions, 30
COLUM. J. ENVTrL. L. 135, 167 (2005).
85 Thompson, supra note 83, at 160-61 (providing examples 
of states falling into
each of the categories); see also Klee, supra note 84, at 167-70 
(stating that forty-two
state constitutions at least mention the environment or natural 
resource conservation,
eight states have clear language granting citizens 
environmental rights, eleven states
include public policy statements on environmental 
protection, and the remaining
twenty-three states at least refer to natural resources 
or environmental protection);
Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Environmental Policy and 
State Constitutions: The Potential Role
of Substantive Guidance, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 863, 867-80, 921-25 (1996) 
(surveying envi-
ronmental and natural resource provisions in state 
constitutions and providing tables
classifying the various types of constitutional provisions); Matthew Thor 
Kirsch, Note,
Upholding the Public Trust in State Constitutions, 46 DuKE 
L.J. 1169, 1173 (1997) ("Each
of the successful [constitutional environmental protection] 
provisions invoke[ I some
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Not surprisingly, the most powerful state constitutional provisions
were enacted in the 1970s at the height of the environmental move-
ment. 6 For instance, article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution, approved in 1971 states:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preser-
vation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the envi-
ronment. Pennsylvania's public natural resources are the common
property of all the people, including generations yet to come. As
trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and
maintain them for the benefit of all the people.8 7
Similarly, Montana's Constitution, approved in 1974, provides an
"inalienable" right to a "clean and healthful environment" and creates
a duty upon both the state and private persons to "maintain and im-
prove a clean and healthful environment in Montana for present and
future generations."8 8 The same provision goes on to require that the
legislature provide for the administration and enforcement of this
duty and provide adequate remedies "for the protection of the envi-
ronmental life support system from degredation and provide ade-
quate remedies to prevent unreasonable depletion and degredation
of natural resources."89
Both the Pennsylvania and Montana constitutions thus not only
codify certain public trust principles regarding the state's obligation
to preserve natural resources for present and future generations, but
also go one step further and provide a right of action for citizens or
the state to enforce those rights.90 Moreover, unlike the common law
combination of the concepts undergirding the public trust doctrine: conservation,
public access and trusteeship.").
86 See, e.g., Kirsch, supra note 85, at 1169 (stating that just after this country's first
"Earth Day," many states began the process of attempting to amend their state consti-
tutions to "reflect a new premium on environmental protection").
87 PA. CoNsT. art I, § 27.
88 MONT, CONST. art. II, § 3; id. art. IX, § 1.
89 Id. art. IX, § 1.
90 Other states which incorporate strong public trust and environmental protec-
tion provisions include Alaska, Hawaii, and Louisiana. SeeALAsKA CONST. art. VIII, § 3
("Wherever occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved to
the people for common use,"); HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1 ("For the benefit of present
and future generations, the State and its political subdivisions shall conserve and pro-
tect Hawaii's natural beauty and all natural resources, including land, water, air, min-
erals and energy sources, and shall promote the development and utilization of these
resources in a manner consistent with their conservation and in furtherance of the
self-sufficiency of the State. All public natural resources are held in trust by the state
for the benefit of the people."); LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 ("The natural resources of the
state, including air and water, and the healthful, scenic, historic and esthetic quality
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public trust doctrine which applies in most states only to navigable
waters and trust resources dependent on navigable waters (such as fish
or migratory birds), these state constitutional provisions extend pro-
tection to a much broader array of resources and species.
While provisions like those in the Pennsylvania and Montana con-
stitutions would appear on their face to provide the solution to the
limitations of the common law public trust doctrine, appearances can
be deceiving. For instance, the Montana courts have interpreted the
constitutional right to a clean and healthful environment quite
broadly to allow a range of actions based on the provision. In 1999, in
Montana Environmental Information Center (MEIC) v. Department of Envi-
ronmental Quality,91 the Montana Supreme Court held that the state's
right to a clean and healthful environment is a fundamental right trig-
gering strict scrutiny and is not limited to health-based standards. In
that case, the court held a nonprofit group could sue the state envi-
ronmental agency and a mining company to prevent discharge of con-
taminants to a river that would adversely impact water quality and
species even though the agency's rules allowed such a discharge. 92
In reaching its decision, the court found that the amendment's
intention was not to create a health-based standard but to permit no
degradation from the present environment and affirmatively require
enhancement of that environment.93 The court also implicitly found
that the right to a clean and healthful environment was "self-execut-
ing" meaning that it was not dependent on or limited to legislative
action or violation of regulatory standards 4 Two years later, in 2001,
the Montana Supreme Court recognized that the right to a clean and
healthful environment imposed requirements not only on state ac-
tion, but also private action, when it held that the provision required
rescission of a private contract for a well installation that would result
in groundwater contamination.9"
of the environment shall be protected, conserved, and replenished insofar as possible
and consistent with the health, safety and welfare of the people.").
91 988 P.2d 1236 (Mont. 1999).
92 Id. at 1249.
93 Id. at 1247 (quoting from delegate statement at constitutional convention).
94 Id. The environmental provisions in the Illinois, Hawaii, and New York consti-
tutions are explicitly self-executing. Courts have reached varying decisions on
whether other state environmental provisions are self-executing where the provision
itself is silent. See, e.g., Robb v. Shockoe Slip Found., 324 S.E.2d 674, 677 (Va. 1985)
(holding that environmental protection provision in Virginia Constitution is not self-
executing); Klee, supra note 84, at 175-78 (discussing issue of self-execution in vari-
ous state constitutions).
95 Cape-Francis Enters. v. Peed, 29 P.3d 1011, 1017 (Mont. 2001).
[VOL. 82:2
MODERN PUBLIC TRUST PRINCIPLES
However, in contrast to the expansive interpretation Montana
courts have given their constitutional environmental provisions,
courts in other states have not generally followed suit. Illinois has a
constitutional provision enacted in 1970 which states that "Itihe pub-
lic policy of the state and the duty of each person is to provide and
maintain a healthful environment for the benefit of this and future
generations." 6 In 1999, the Illinois Supreme Court interpreted this
provision to allow a private party standing to seek to enjoin construc-
tion of a dam on a creek that allegedly would impact state endangered
species. 97 However, the court dismissed the complaint on grounds
that the constitutional provision was to protect public health, which
does not include protection of species. 8 Although the decision was
subject to a strong dissent citing the growing knowledge of the inter-
relatedness between the human condition and plant and animal spe-
cies,99 the case means that the Illinois Constitution likely cannot be
used in situations where the plaintiff cannot prove the action or inac-
tion will directly affect human health, as opposed to the environment
generally.
Moreover, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not given much
teeth to the aspirational language contained in section 27 of its consti-
tution quoted earlier in this Article. Although Pennsylvania courts
have held that section 27 is self-executing, they have also held ex-
pressly that in evaluating development projects, the constitution does
not require consideration of any environmental factors not already
required by statute. 10 1 As a result, despite its broad language, section
96 ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
97 Glisson v. City of Marion, 720 N.E.2d 1034, 1045 (Ill. 1999).
98 Id. at 1034.
99 Id. at 1046 (HarrisonJ, dissenting) ("We protect threatened and endangered
species because, in doing so, we protect ourselves and the welfare of Illinoisans who
will inherit this land when we are gone.... To suggest, as my colleagues do, that the
only environmental threats implicated by our Constitution are those that emanate
from a smoke stack, drain pipe or car exhaust ignores wisdom, science and the plain
language of the law.").
100 See Borough of Moosic v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 429 A.2d 1237, 1240 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1981) (holding that section 27 does not require considering factors be-
yond those in existing statutes when assessing actions harmful to the environment);
Cmty. Coll. of Del. County v. Fox, 342 A.2d 468, 480-82 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975)
(same); see also Snelling v. Dep't of Transp., 366 A.2d 1298, 1305 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1976) ("Section 27 does not require consideration of factors beyond those which, by
statute, must be considered in evaluating projects which are potentially harmful to the
environment."); Commonwealth v. Nat'l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 302 A.2d
886, 892 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973), affd, 311 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1973) ("We find no more
reason to hold that Section 27 needs legislative definition than that the peoples' [sic]
freedoms of religion and speech should wait upon the pleasure of the General Assem-
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27 on its own provides no substantive check on actions that may harm
the environment.' 0 '
Even in those states with more directive environmental rights lan-
guage, such as Montana, state supreme courts in only four of the eight
states with such language in their constitutions have addressed the na-
ture of these rights (Montana, Illinois, Louisiana and Hawaii) and
many other courts have found that their provisions are not self-execut-
ing.102 As a result, there are very few cases where state courts have
held on the merits that a state constitutional provision provides singu-
lar authority to prevent or require state or private action and most
commentators have concluded that the provisions are largely ineffec-
tive in most states. 10 3 This ineffectiveness has been attributed to vari-
ous factors, including state court decisions holding that the provisions
are not self-executing and the rise of federal and state environmental
statutes beginning in the 1970s which have provided easier vehicles to
pursue environmental rights than the general provisions in state con-
stitutions. 1 4 Commentators have also criticized the use of such con-
stitutional provisions to drive environmental policy, arguing that they
should not be a substitute for the direct legislative process,10 5 result in
cluttered state constitutions1 6 and inappropriately inject complicated
bly."); Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 97 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973) ("Section 27. .. is a
self-executing provision in accordance with doctrines of public trust and represents a
proper exercise of state powers within the scope of the Ninth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.").
101 See Kirsch, supra note 85, at 1200-02 (describing Pennsylvania courts' interpre-
tation of section 27 and concluding that courts "have undermined the intent of Penn-
sylvanians who adopted the state constitution's environmental protection provision");
see also Commonwealth v. Nat'l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 311 A.2d 588, 596,
599 (Pa. 1973) (Jones, C.J., dissenting) ("This Court has been given the opportunity
to affirm the mandate of the public empowering the Commonwealth to prevent envi-
ronmental abuses; instead, the Court has chosen to emasculate a constitutional
amendment by declaring it not to be self-executing.... In one swift stroke the Court
has disemboweled a constitutional provision which seems, by unequivocal language,
to establish environmental control by public trust and, in so doing consequently sanc-
tions the desecration of a unique national monument.")
102 See Klee, supra note 84, at 175-78.
103 See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 83, at 158 (arguing that state constitution envi-
ronmental provisions "have had little consequence in most of the states that have
adopted them"); Thompson, supra note 85, at 865 (finding that "courts have seldom
invoked substantial environmental [constitutional] provisions to constrain or dictate
state policy"); Kirsch, supra note 85, at 1171 (stating that "commentators have almost
universally lamented the ineffectiveness" of state constitution environmental
provisions).
104 See Thompson, supra note 83.
105 See id. at 196-97.
106 Id. at 160-65.
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social policy issues into state constitutions where 
they do not
belong.1 0
7
Thus, lobbying for new and improved state 
constitutional provi-
sions expanding the scope of public trust resources 
or providing addi-
tional environmental rights is likely not the best 
path toward creating
an improved structure to protect natural 
resources. One problem
that is inherent in state environmental constitutional 
provisions is that
they by necessity contain broad, aspirational 
language usually devoid
of the specific standards necessary to implement 
concrete measures to
protect the environment in a complex world.
10 Indeed, the critics
are correct that the type of clarity and detail 
needed to implement
environmental policy is better suited to legislative 
and administrative
pronouncements (or even common law) and is not at 
home in consti-
tutional documents.
However this does not mean existing and 
future state constitu-
tional provisions expressing public trust principles 
or creating envi-
ronmental rights need remain merely aspirational 
statements devoid
of any real legal significance. Instead, the 
question remains whether
these constitutional provisions can work together 
with other more de-
tailed environmental policy directives in 
legislation or developed in
the common law to protect public trust resources. 
Indeed, a vision of
environmental protection for future generations 
embedded in a state
constitution may be just what it takes to provide needed 
support for
state implementation of a controversial environmental 
protection pro-
gram that adversely impacts private property 
rights. It may also be just
what it takes to cause a court to give additional 
scrutiny to state action
or inaction that may result in destruction 
of natural resources. Fi-
nally, it may be just what it takes to cause a court to 
strengthen its
historic common law public trust doctrine 
and apply it to new situa-
tions not contemplated at the time of the 
doctrine's inception.
C. Statutory and Regulatory Developments: Standards,
Direction and Precision
The most significant and tangible result 
of the environmental
movement of the 1970s was not the development 
of the modern pub-
lic trust doctrine or the adoption of state 
constitutional provisions on
the environment but the creation of comprehensive 
federal environ-
107 See Ruhi, supra note 82, at 260.
108 See, e.g., id. at 254-55 (discussing difficulty of creating 
a constitutional environ-
mental quality provision that could attract broad 
social support while still being
drafted with sufficient precision to avoid ambiguity 
and result in binding legal
principles).
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mental statutes and the agencies to implement them through regula-
tion and enforcement. 10 9 These developments at the federal level led
to a similar explosion of laws, regulations and agencies at the state
level, as the states began to implement federal mandates through the
concept of "cooperative federalism."' 10 These new federal and state
statutes in the 1970s and 1980s thus set legislative policy and created
enforcement mechanisms on a national and state level in areas of air
pollution, water pollution, pesticides, toxic substances, soil and
groundwater contamination and remediation techniques."1 ' These
federal and state environmental protection statutes form the basis of
the environmental regulatory state that exists today. Many of these
statutes, particularly the National Environmental Policy Act,' 12 the
Clean Water Act,' 13 and the Endangered Species Act, 1 4 are based on
public trust principles in the sense that they set out a policy of protect-
ing and preserving the environment for its own sake and for future
generations.' 1 5
In addition to these federal and state environmental protection
statutes, however, there also exists a different type of environmental
statute based expressly on public trust principles, described here as
state "environmental rights" statutes. Once again, Sax is responsible
109 See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 91 (5th ed. 2006)
(describing the time period from 1970 to 1980 as containing an "explosion" of federal
legislation and creating an era of "federal regulatory infrastructure"); id. at 91-92
(providing a chronology of significant federal environmental legislation between
1970 and 1980, including the National Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Air
Amendments of 1970, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act),
the 1972 Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act, the Endangered Species Act,
the Safe Drinking Water Act, the Toxic Substantives Control Act, the Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act, and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation and Liability Act); Ruhl, supra note 82, at 247 ("By the mid-1970s, however,
the command-and-control regime of federal environmental protection legislation had
evolved with unprecedented speed into a juggernaut of the administrative state.").
110 See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 109, at 103-04 (stating that the predominant
approach to federal-state relations under the environmental statutes today is "cooper-
ative federalism" where federal agencies establish national environmental standards
and states may opt to assume responsibility for administering them).
111 See, e.g., id. at 91-98 (describing federal environmental laws setting policy di-
rectives and a comprehensive regulatory framework); Richard Revesz, Federalism and
Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REv. 553, 626-30
(2001) (describing increased expertise and competence in the environmental area at
the state level).
112 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2000).
113 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387.
114 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544.
115 See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 1, at 1213 (recognizing Sax's influence on federal
environmental statutes); Manus, supra note 37, at 331 (same).
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for this development and his vision for incorporating public trust
principles into statutory law now becomes the third of three public
trust forms discussed in this Article.
In 1970, the same year as his famous article on the public trust
doctrine, Sax also published a book titled Defending the Environment, in
which he set out in more detail the potential for the public trust doc-
trine as well as other mechanisms for judicial review of actions that
may harm the environment. 116 He ended the book with a discussion
of a "model law" that, at the book's publication, had just come into
existence in the state of Michigan. Sax assisted in drafting this law,
known as the Michigan Environmental Policy Act (MEPA),1 7 which
Sax stated had three purposes. He described these purposes as recog-
nizing the public right to a decent environment as an enforceable le-
gal right; making it enforceable by private citizens suing as members
of the public; and setting the stage for the development of a common
law of environmental quality. 118 As to the third consideration, Sax
stated that the bill purposefully did not define pollution, environmen-
tal quality or the public trust in order to allow the courts to develop a
common law approach to environmental problems. In this way courts
would have the ability to address problems as they were identified and
formulate a flexible solution for the occasion.1 19
These state statutes providing for citizen standing to protect the
environment and more aggressive judicial review of state and private
action have, just like state constitutional environmental provisions,
met with mixed results. For instance, the Minnesota legislature en-
acted the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act (MERA) 20 in 1971
and substantially modeled it after Michigan's law. I21 MERA gives any
natural person, corporation, state agency or municipality the right to
bring a civil action in district court for declaratory or equitable relief
against any person "for the protection of the air, water, land, or other
natural resources" within the state, whether publicly or privately
owned, "from pollution, impairment or destruction." 2 2 "Natural re-
116 See SAX, supra note 9, at 149-92.
117 MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 324.1701-.1706 (West 2005).
118 SAx, supra note 9, at 248.
119 Id.
120 MINN. STAT. §§ 116B.01-.13 (2004).
121 See State ex rel. Wacouta Twp. v. Brunkow Hardwood Corp., 510 N.W.2d 27, 30
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that MERA was modeled after Michigan's Environmen-
tal Protection Act and adopting Michigan courts' four-factor test to determine
whether an action's effect on natural resources is sufficient to justify judicial
intervention),
122 See MINN. STAT. § 116B.03 (right of civil action); id, § 116B.02 (definitions).
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sources" include, but are not limited to "all mineral, animal, botani-
cal, air, water, land, timber, soil, quietude, recreational and historical
resources" as well as scenic and esthetic resources when owned by the
government. 12 3 A plaintiff can establish "pollution, impairment or de-
struction" of natural resources either by showing the conduct at issue
will violate an environmental standard or permit or by showing that
the conduct at issue "materially adversely affects or is likely to materi-
ally adversely affect the environment." 24
Minnesota courts have interpreted MERA very expansively,
broadly granting citizens standing to challenge state, local, and private
actions, and concluding that the "natural resources" protected under
the law include birds and the trees they nest in,125 historic build-
ings,126 marsh and wildlife areas, 127 the view from a state forest and
the wilderness experience in visiting the forest, 128 quietude in residen-
tial areas, 129 drinking water wells, and wetlands.'3 0 Actions that have
123 Id. § 116B.02(4).
124 See id. § 116B.02(5). The law is subject to some exceptions, namely that a
plaintiff cannot show violation of a standard solely because of the introduction of
odor into the air and no action is allowed for conduct taken pursuant to any environ-
mental quality standard, license, stipulation agreement or permit issued by the Min-
nesota Pollution Control Agency or the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources.
Moreover, if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the defendant has the oppor-
tunity to present an affirmative defense that there is no feasible or prudent alternative
to the action. Economic considerations alone are not a defense. See id. § 116B.02(5);
§ 116B.03-.04.
125 Wacouta, 510 N.W.2d at 30 (finding bald eagles and trees in which they roost
are "natural resources" under MERA).
126 State ex rel. Archabal v. County of Hennepin, 495 N.W.2d 416, 421-26 (Minn.
1993) (finding MERA action available to enjoin county from demolishing historic
armory building to build a jail); State ex rel. Powderly v. Erickson, 285 N.W.2d 84,
87-89 (Minn. 1979) (holding that row houses were historical resources protected by
MERA and defendant did not sustain burden of proving no feasible and prudent
alternative to demolition).
127 County of Freeborn ex rel. Tuveson v. Bryson, 210 N.W.2d 290, 297 (Minn.
1973) (holding that marsh area is a "natural resource" within the statute, plaintiff met
prima facie case of showing pollution, impairment and destruction, and remanding
case so that state could present affirmative defense of no feasible and prudent
alternative).
128 State ex rel. Drabik v. Martz, 451 N.W.2d 893, 896-98 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990)
(affirming district court order temporarily enjoining construction of private radio
tower on private land that abutted state forest based on allegations that the tower
would spoil the view and the wilderness experience in the park and would pose a risk
for birds).
129 Citizens for a Safe Grant v. Lone Oak Sportsmen's Club, 624 N.W.2d 796, 806
(Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that quietude was a natural resource under MERA
and evidence was sufficient to show gun club violated MERA).
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been enjoined under the law include a gravel pit,131 a shooting
range, 32 tree harvesting, 133 a private radio tower on private land,13 4
and condemnations for highway and jail projects. 135
The law's most significant impact on protection of natural re-
sources and the environment can be seen in the automatic standing
given to all persons and the fact that the law can protect natural re-
sources where existing state statutory or regulatory law is silent or state
regulators decline to take action. 13 6 For instance, in a case involving a
shooting range that was disturbing residential neighbors, the court
found a MERA violation for impairment of "quietude" and enjoined
the range's operation despite the fact that there were no local or state
noise standards in place. 137 Indeed, state statutory law prohibited
state agencies from even enacting such standards. 38
By contrast, Michigan courts have been less generous on standing
issues in interpreting the Michigan Environmental Policy Act
(MEPA) 13 9 than have Minnesota courts in interpreting the Minnesota
law. As noted above, Michigan enacted MEPA as the first environ-
mental rights statute in 1970 after Sax worked with state citizen orga-
nizations and the state legislature to help draft the law. MEPA
subsequently served as a model for other states.' 40 Like the Minnesota
law, Michigan courts have interpreted MEPA to provide for declara-
130 State ex rel. Shakopee Mdwakanton Sioux Cmty. v. City of Prior Lake, Case No.
C-01-05286 (Scott County Dist. Ct., Nov. 22, 2002) (finding proposed gravel pit would
interfere with tribe's drinking water well and a DNR-protected wetland and enjoining
gravel pit in the absence of significant modifications).
131 Id.
132 Citizens for a Safe Grant, 624 N.W.2d at 806.
133 State ex rel. Wacouta Twp. v. Brunkow Hardwood Corp., 510 N.W.2d 27, 29-31
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
134 State ex re. Drabik v. Martz, 451 N.W.2d 893, 896-98 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
135 State ex rel. Archabal v. Hennepin County, 495 N.W.2d 416, 421-26 (Minn.
1993) (condemnation for jail); County of Freeborn v. Bryson, 210 N.W.2d 290,
297-98 (Minn. 1973) (condemnation for highway).
136 See, e.g., Citizens for a Safe Grant, 624 N.W.2d at 806 (rejecting argument that
MERA is invalid without the existence of state or local noise standards); State ex rel.
Shakopee Mdwakanton Sioux Cmty. v. City of Prior Lake, Case No. C-01-05286 (Scott
County Dist. Ct., Nov. 22, 2002) (finding evidence to support MERA claim to protect
wetland even though DNR had taken no action against gravel pit and did not testify at
the trial).
137 Citizens for a Safe Grant, 624 N.W.2d at 806.
138 Id.
139 MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 324.1701-.1706 (West 1999).
140 See Susan George et al., The Public in Action: Using State Citizen Suit Statutes to
Protect Biodiversity, 6 U. BALT. J. ENV-L. L. 1, 14-20 & app. A (1997) (summarizing
citizen suit laws).
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tory and injunctive relief to prevent harm to natural resources even
where the action at issue does not violate a statute or regulation.1 4' As
a result, MEPA empowers the judiciary to create a common law of
environmental quality that goes beyond existing state statutes or regu-
latory requirements in a manner similar to that developed under the
common law of nuisance or other torts.' 42
Also similar to the Minnesota law, courts have interpreted the
scope of the Michigan law quite broadly to apply to toxic substances
control, sand dune mining, wetlands protection, park management
and leasing of Great Lakes bottomlands.' 43 As in Minnesota, the
Michigan legislature created broad coverage for the law, allowing for
action to protect "the air, water, and other natural resources and the
public trust in those resources from pollution, impairment, or de-
struction."144 Thus, as Sax envisioned, the law gives the judicial
branch the authority as a matter of common law to prevent the im-
pairment of natural resources where the government cannot or will
not act pursuant to state or local legislative policy.' 45
However, Michigan courts have been fairly restrictive on the issue
of citizen standing to enforce the law. Like the Minnesota law, MEPA
contains a broad citizen suit provision which states that "any person
may maintain an action . . . for the protection of the air, water, and
other natural resources and the public trust in those resources from
pollution, impairment, or destruction.' ' 46 Notwithstanding this lan-
guage, in a 2004 decision, the Michigan Supreme Court held that
MEPA could not confer standing on citizens that was any broader
than allowed under the state constitution's separation of powers doc-
141 See, e.g., Ray v. Mason County Drain Comm'r, 224 N.W.2d 883, 888 (Mich.
1975).
142 See id.
143 See George et al., supra note 140, at 17; Jeffrey K. Haynes, Michigan's Environ-
mental Protection Act in its Sixth Year: Substantive Environmental Law from Citizen Suits, 53
J. URB. L. 589, 594 (1976),
144 MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.1701(1).
145 See, e.g., Mich. Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nesfl6 Waters N. Am., Inc.,
709 N.W.2d 174, 211-13 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that MEPA provides for de
novo review for "'judicial development of a common law of environmental quality'")
(quoting Ray, 224 N.W.2d at 888); see aLsoJoseph L. Sax & Roger L. Conner, Michi-
gan's Environmental Protection Act of 1970: A Progress Report, 70 MicH. L. Rrv. 1003, 1005
(1972) (noting that the significance of MEPA is that it "reduced the broad discretion"
of regulatory agencies and now those agencies must be prepared to defend them-
selves "against charges that their decisions fail to protect natural resources from pollu-
tion, impairment, or destruction").
146 MicH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 324.1701(1) (West 1999) (emphasis added).
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trine.' 47 More recently, in a 2005 decision, the Michigan Court of
Appeals held that standing doctrine limited the ability of a water con-
servation organization and plaintiffs residing along a stream and lake
to sue under MEPA to prevent water pumping that would allegedly
adversely impact a lake and wetlands. 148 In reaching its decision, the
court of appeals relied on the state supreme court precedent and held
that in order to bring suit under MEPA, the plaintiffs needed to show
that they actually used the areas in question to meet constitutional
standing requirements.149 The court of appeals then concluded that
with regard to certain of the physical areas at issue in the lawsuit, the
plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the MEPA claims.15 0
In all, by the late 1990s only fifteen states had environmental
rights statutes on the books (as opposed to citizen suit provisions con-
tained in state environmental laws for the purpose of enforcing those
laws), and most state environmental rights statutes are much more
limited than those in Minnesota and Michigan, allowing only for ac-
tions against the state, or only for actions to enforce violations of ex-
isting law.15 1 In addition, environmental rights lawsuits are expensive
and the few statutes that allow recovery of attorneys' fees are within
the category of laws that provide for a right of action only for violation
of existing law. 152 Indeed, the strength of the best of these statutes is
that the court conducts a de novo review of evidence rather than an
on-the-record review with great deference to the government agency
making the decision. However, it is just this type of de novo review
that requires discovery and expert testimony which is too expensive
147 Nat'l Wildlife Fed. v. Cleveland Cliffs ,Iron Co., 684 N.W.2d 800, 807 (Mich.
2004) ("When a broadening and redefinition of the 'judicial power' comes not from
the judiciary itself, but from the Legislature purporting to confer new powers upon
the judiciary, the exercise of such power is no less improper.").
148 Mich. Citizens, 709 N.W.2d at 211-13; see Sax & Conner, supra note 145, at 1005.
149 Mich. Citizens, 709 N.W.2d at 212 (stating that earlier decisions "clearly deter-
mined that the Legislature was without the authority to expand standing beyond the
limits imposed by Michigan's constitution").
150 Id. at 211 ("Because plaintiffs do not use these areas, they cannot demonstrate
that they have suffered or would suffer a concrete and particularized injury distinct
from that of the public generally."). The Michigan Supreme Court recently agreed to
review the standing portions of the decision and thus changes in standing doctrine
under MEPA may be forthcoming. See Mich. Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nes-
t6h Waters N. Am., Inc., 722 N.W.2d 422 (Mich. 2006) (granting motions for leave to
file amicus briefs and directing the parties to submit supplemental briefs on the issue
of standing).
151 See George et al., supra note 140, at 15-16.
152 See id. at app. A.
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for most plaintiffs to contemplate. 15,3 Thus, just as was concluded ear-
lier with regard to the common law public trust doctrine and state
constitutional provisions, state environmental rights statutes on their
own are not a complete solution to better preservation of natural re-
sources where federal, state or local protection efforts break down.
The same is true to a lesser extent with federal and state environ-
mental protection statutes. Although such laws and the enforcement
mechanisms that go with them form the bulk of our environmental
protection efforts today, even these powerful statutes have their limita-
tions. For instance, some statutes do not allow private parties to ob-
tain injunctive relief or damages, others do not allow private rights of
action at all, and there can also be significant delays in statutory au-
thority to address controversial problems such as today's concerns
over greenhouse gas emissions.15 4
153 See, e.g., Haynes, supra note 143, at 634-35 (stating that while MEPA citizen
suits have achieved many goals, they are "not a panacea; they are not meant to sup-
plant existing administrative regulation. The potential strength of MEPA is ham-
pered, however, by the critical lack of public interest law firms and well-financed,
permanent environmental groups with a defined target area of environmental
degradation.")
154 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7002(a) (2000) (citizen suit provision of RCRA allowing
private parties to seek injunctive relief but not damages for action contributing to
imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment for violation
of law's hazardous waste requirements); 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000) (allowing citizen
suits under Clean Water Act for assessment of civil penalties or imposition of injunc-
tive relief for violation of effluent standards or limitations but no right to seek com-
pensatory damages); 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2000) (providing right of action to seek civil
penalties and injunctive relief for violation of Clean Air Act statutory provisions but
no right to seek compensatory damages); 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2000) (providing for the
recovery of response costs but not for injunctive relief or compensatory damages for
releases of hazardous substances); see also Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S.
431, 449-52 (2005) (confirming that there is no private right of action under the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136 but hold-
ing that FIFRA does not preempt state common law claims that do not challenge the
pesticide label). As an example of limitations on state actions, CERCLA does not
provide states with the authority to seek an injunction to force a responsible private
party to remediate a hazardous waste site even if there is an imminent threat to
human health and the environment. Instead, that authority is limited to the federal
government. As a result, a state seeking to force a cleanup must resort to the com-
mon law of nuisance to obtain injunctive relief. See New York v. Shore Realty, 759
F.2d 1032, 1049-52 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding injunctive relief under CERCLA was not
available to state but that injunction could issue against defendant under New York
public nuisance law); see also PLATR ET AL., supra note 37, at 165-75 (discussing equi-
table relief, compensatory damages and punitive damages available for environmental
harms under the common law); Alexandra B. Klass, From Reservoirs to Remediation: The
Impact of CERCLA on Common Law Strict Liability Environmental Claims, 39 WAKE FOREST
L. Ruv. 903, 905 (2004) (noting that common law claims are necessary to recover for
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As a whole, however, federal and state environmental 
protection
laws coupled with state environmental rights statutes where they 
exist
serve an important role not only in their own 
right but also in setting
forth legislative policy on protection of natural resources, 
public trust
principles and the environment for use in common 
law or constitu-
tional development. In the majority of cases where such resources 
are
threatened, federal, state and/or local enforcement 
agencies will use
federal and state environmental protection laws 
to address the prob-
lem. However, as Sax and many others have 
documented, govern-
ment regulation and enforcement can break down 
because of lack of
political will, time, money or other resources, or 
competing legal con-
cerns such as constitutional takings arguments. 
The question then re-
mains in those situations whether the policy directives 
in these laws
can be used in conjunction with the common law public trust doctrine
and/or state constitutional provisions. In other 
words, can these
seemingly discrete sources of law work together to 
either support state
or local action to protect the environment when 
there are competing
private property principles, or allow citizen protection 
of resources in
the face of governmental indifference or opposition? 
The next Part
explores recent judicial efforts to adopt such a mutually reinforcing
approach to state natural resource protection 
using public trust
principles.
II. RECENT JUDICIAL TRENDS: EXPANDING THE 
SCOPE OF AUTHORITY
TO IMPLEMENT PUBLIC TRUST PRINCIPLES
Most of the scholarly work to date on the public 
trust doctrine
focuses almost exclusively on either the common 
law doctrine or its
state constitutional manifestations or its codification 
into state statutes.
Although a study of one form of the doctrine 
on those topics may
often make a brief reference to one of the other 
forms, there has not
been any real effort to consider what the public 
trust might look like
as a cohesive whole where all three forms 
mutually reinforce each
other.155 A review of the case law shows, however, 
that while scholars
have largely ignored this approach, courts have 
not. Just like lawyers,
property damage, personal injury and punitive damages associated 
with contamina-
tion to soil and groundwater). For a discussion of the 
current inability of federal
statutory law to address greenhouse gas emissions 
and other modern environmental
issues, see infra notes 280-81 and accompanying text.
155 One exception is Kirsch, supra note 85, 
where the author focuses on environ-
mental provisions in state constitutions but also 
discusses in some detail the relation-
ship between those provisions and the common 
law public trust doctrine to argue that
courts were able to give the most meaning to the 
state constitutional provisions when
they were interpreted as "evocations" of the public 
trust doctrine. Id. at 1174.
2006]
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judges must frequently look beyond the direct authority available to
support a legal principle to related authority in order 
to build a strong
legal basis for a position. It is precisely this type crafting 
of legal opin-
ions that gives the judicial branch its unique and important role 
in
our federalist system of law built on constitutions, 
statutes, and the
common law.
15 6
Notably, the judicial opinions that utilize this mutually reinforc-
ing approach to public trust principles for environmental 
protection
purposes have been issued primarily in the last 
ten years. One expla-
nation for this recent trend is that the field of 
environmental law is
now, after thirty years, reaching maturity and 
there is a strong body of
state constitutional law and, more importantly, 
federal and state envi-
ronmental statutes that courts can rely on not 
only in implementing
those constitutional provisions and statutes, 
but also in developing
public trust principles. Moreover, as the modern 
common law public
trust doctrine has developed since the 1970s, 
courts can now rely on
that body of law to inform their interpretations 
of state constitutional
law and statutory law.
This shift in judicial treatment of public trust principles 
to
broaden the range of authority is an exciting 
development that ad-
dresses many of the concerns of the critics and, as 
discussed below,
can bring the doctrine to a new level of relevance 
today. This is partic-
ularly important in states that historically have 
not had a strong public
trust doctrine or do not have constitutional provisions 
or statutes codi-
fying the doctrine in some manner. Because Illinois 
Central appears to
impose the public trust doctrine nationwide (i.e., states can 
interpret
it narrowly but not abolish it),157 states or citizens in those 
states can
156 See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON 
LAW 32 (Mark DeWolfe Howe
ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881) (urging courts 
to create a "more conscious
recognition" of legislation in developing the 
common law); ROSCOE POUND, THE
SPIRIT OF TI-E COMMON LAW 174-75 (Neil Hamilton 
& Mathias Alfred Jaren eds.,
Transaction Publishers 1999) (1921) (focusing on the 
necessity of the common law
despite the growth of statutes and stating 
that the role of the courts is not just to
interpret statutes but to "incorporate" legislation 
into the growing body of common
law tradition); Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the 
United States, 50 HARV. L. REv.
4, 14 (1936) (stating that judges should recognize the "social 
policy and judgment,
expressed in legislation" in forming the common 
law).
157 See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 
U.S. 387, 452-53 (1892) (holding states
are not authorized to abdicate control over 
trust lands); Lazarus, supra note 2, at 639
n.
3 7 (stating that there is no language in Illinois Central limiting 
the decision to Illi-
nois law and the majority "most likely assumed its decision 
applied to all states");
Wilkinson, supra note 11, at 453-55 (stating that the 
parties in Illinois Central were
arguing principles of general applicability, 
not just Illinois law, and that the opinion
leaves "little doubt that the Court conceived 
of a general trust that applied to all
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use the public trust doctrine where appropriate and rely on general
state or federal environmental statutes to provide standards for
development.
Certainly, one might argue that the Erie doctrine'5 s implicitly
overruled Illinois Central's efforts to mandate the public trust doctrine
nationwide because the Court did not expressly ground the doctrine
in any particular constitutional provision or federal statute. However,
in its most recent consideration of the public trust doctrine in 1988,159
the Court did not question the vitality of the doctrine, simply stating
that the scope of the doctrine was a matter of state law.160 Moreover,
even if the doctrine is now wholly a matter of state law, no state has
taken steps to abolish it and at least one state court has invalidated
legislative efforts to abolish it.l 6 1 Indeed, all of the precedent support-
ing an expansion of the public trust doctrine consistent with the
framework set forth here is found in state law, not federal law. As a
result, even if states could refuse to recognize the doctrine entirely,
that theoretical possibility does not detract from present opportuni-
ties to give new life to the doctrine as a matter of state law in those
states that have the tools (i.e., state constitutions, statutes and policy
directives) and are inclined to move in that direction.
The recent cases that provide examples of this new public trust
framework tend to fall into two general categories. The first category
is where courts rely on a combination of the public trust doctrine,
state constitutional provisions, or state environmental statutes to inval-
idate state action (whether administrative or legislative) that may
place state public resources in jeopardy. The second category is
states"). Although the decision imposes the public trust obligation on all states, the
decision is less than clear on the source of that obligation. See Lazarus, supra note 2,
at 639-40 (stating some language in the opinion suggests the Court was announcing a
rule based on federal law, that the tone of the opinion "nearly strikes constitutional
chords" but subsequent Supreme Court decisions imply that the case rested on state
law (citing Appelby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 395 (1926)); Wilkinson, supra
note 11, at 453-57 (noting that the Supreme Court has never explicitly stated the
source of law that mandates the public trust obligation in the states but raising the
possibility that it may be based on federal preemption through Congress's authority
over navigable watercourses in the Commerce Clause); see also supra notes 25-30 and
accompanying text.
158 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938) (rejecting the idea of
a federal common law outside specialized contexts); I LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 470-72 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing the scope and impact of Erie).
159 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
160 Id. at 482-85; see also supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
161 See San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 972 P.2d 179, 199 (Ariz. 1999)
(holding as a matter of state constitutional law that a state cannot abrogate the public
trust doctrine by statute).
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where courts rely on a combination of the public 
trust doctrine, state
constitutional provisions, and state environmental 
statutes to uphold
governmental actions that prevent development 
of private property
without finding such government action constitutes 
a taking. These
cases usually involve governmental entities refusing 
to grant a devel-
opment permit or enacting a regulation to 
protect natural resources
on the grounds that the private property in question 
is subject to and
thus inherently limited by public trust principles.
The decisions in both categories of cases show 
the courts looking
at the idea of the public trust and the preservation 
of resources
broadly, and using various strands of authority 
to create support for
protection of such resources. Notably, these decisions 
are primarily in
jurisdictions that do not have a history of recognizing 
a "strong" com-
mon law public trust doctrine (such as exists in California, 
New Jersey
or Wisconsin), and thus shows how the common law public 
trust doc-
trine can be used in conjunction with other authority when 
common
law authority on its own may be lacking.
A. judicial Use of Public Trust Principles to Prevent State Action
The cases that follow are all recent examples of 
courts invoking a
combination of authority related to protection 
of natural resources
and the environment in situations where the 
state is alleged to be re-
linquishing or compromising the resources or 
the public's interest in
those resources. In all these cases, courts look 
to some combination
of common law, state constitutional law, and/or 
statutory environ-
mental law to invalidate the state action.
For instance, in 2004, the Hawaii Supreme Court 
considered
whether a reservation of water for instream use 
was protected by the
public trust, and whether the state water commission 
sufficiently con-
sidered public trust principles in granting 
a water permit.1 62 The
court held that the commission failed to take 
those principles into
account, expressly holding that "a reservation 
of water constitutes a
public trust purpose with respect to the state's continuing 
trust obliga-
tion" to ensure water resources for present 
and future generations.
163
In reaching this decision, the court looked to the 
common law public
trust doctrine, the state constitution, and the statutory 
water code as
support for its decision. The court held that failure 
to protect such
water reservations "would undermine the public 
trust doctrine, which
is a state constitutional doctrine, and the relevant 
policy declarations
162 In reWai'ola 0 Moloka'i, Inc., 83 P.3d 664 (Haw. 2004).
163 Id. at 694.
[VOL. 82:2N-TREF D AME LAW REVIEW
2006] MODERN PUBLIC TRUST 
PRINCIPLES 't3l
set forth in the Code."
164 Thus, the court broadened its base of au-
thority with regard to natural resources within the 
state in order to
provide the maximum protection for such resources.
Similarly, in Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Environmental 
Control
Commission,165 the Louisiana Supreme Court held 
that a state agency
decision allowing construction and operation of a 
hazardous waste dis-
posal facility was contrary to state statutory law, 
constitutional law and
the public trust doctrine. The court remanded 
the case to the agency
to reconsider the relevant constitutional 
and statutory require-
ments.166 In its remand order, the court expressly 
addressed the
"[iinterrelationship of (clonstitutional, [si tatutory and 
r] egulatory
[rlequirements" beginning with the state constitution's 
environmen-
tal provision enacted in 1974, placing obligations 
on state agencies
and officials.' 67 The court then went on to consider 
various state envi-
ronmental statutes setting forth a policy of environmental 
protection.
These policies set out not only substantive requirements 
but "very im-
portant procedural provisions" designed to ensure 
agencies exercise
appropriate discretion in all cases.'
68 The court concluded this dis-
cussion by stating that the state regulatory framework 
was based not
only on the state constitutional provisions related 
to environmental
protection, but also the "public trust doctrine," 
and referred to Sax's
article and other commentators setting forth 
an expansive vision of
the doctrine. 1
69
Likewise, in 1996, in Pullen v. ULmer,
170 the Alaska Supreme Court
addressed whether a ballot initiative to give salmon 
harvest preference
to subsistence, personal use and sport fisheries 
was valid. The court
held that the initiative was an unconstitutional 
appropriation of state
resources.
17
' First, the court looked to article VIII, section 
2 of the
Alaska Constitution which reserves fish, wildlife, 
and waters to the peo-
ple for common use.' 72 The court then turned to the 
common law,
noting that the relevant constitutional provision 
was intended to cod-
ify "historic common law principles" over management 
of fish, wildlife
164 Id.
165 452 So. 2d 1152 (La. 1984).
166 Id. at 1153.
167 Id. at 1156.
168 Id. at 1157.
169 Id. at 1158.
170 923 P.2d 54 (Alaska 1996).
171 Id. at 60-65.
172 Id. at 60.
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and water resources, and impose a trust on those resources. 73 Inter-
estingly, this case highlights the conflict that can occur between the
public trust doctrine as a protector of public access rights and the
public trust doctrine as a protector of the resource. Arguably, the
court's decision limited the state's ability to preserve fishing resources
from overuse, thus favoring the doctrine's traditional purpose of pre-
serving public access to resources over its more modern purpose of
preserving the resource itself.
Finally, two cases from Arizona illustrate the state judiciary rely-
ing on the public trust doctrine to prevent the state legislature from
interfering with public trust resources. In the first case, Arizona Center
for Law in the Public Interest v. Hassell,174 the Arizona Court of Appeals
addressed whether legislation substantially relinquishing the state's in-
terests in riverbed lands violated the public trust doctrine. The court
cited first to Illinois Central in support of the doctrine, 75 then to vari-
ous statutory and constitutional provisions in other states for the pro-
position that states are required to hold such lands in trust for the
public.1 76 The court then looked to Arizona precedent, recognized
that the doctrine had not yet been applied in Arizona, but stated that
in order to resolve the case "we need not weave ajurisprudence out of
air."1 77 The court relied not only on Illinois Central, Sax's article, and
authority from other states, but also on the state's "constitutional com-
mitment to the checks and balances of a government of divided pow-
ers."1 7  Thus, the court stated it would scrutinize closely any state
action that might violate the public trust doctrine and, applying such
scrutiny, found the legislation violated the state's public trust princi-
ples. 179 Here, the court had very little in the way of state common law
authority to rely upon, but reached a decision based on its own consti-
173 Id. A few years later, in Brooks v. Wright, 971 P.2d 1025 (Alaska 1999), the
Alaska Supreme Court had occasion to revisit the concept of a state public trust over
resources and rejected the argument that a public trust over resources must follow
private trust principles. The court explained that private trusts generally require the
trustee to maximize economic yield from the trust property, but the state constitution
"requires that natural resources be managed for the benefit of all people under the
assumption that both development and preservation may be necessary to provide for
future generations, and that income generation is not the sole purpose of the trust
relationship." Id. at 1032.
174 837 P.2d 158 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).
175 Id. at 166-67.
176 Id. at 167 n.13.
177 Id. at 168.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 169-73.
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tutional separation of powers principles as well as 
statutory, constitu-
tional, and common law precedent in other jurisdictions.
In the second Arizona case, San Carlos Apache 
Tribe v. Superior
Court ex rel. Maricopa,
°80 the Arizona Supreme Court in 1999 reviewed
a state statute enacted in 1995 which stated that 
"[tihe public trust is
not an element of a water right" and that in adjudicating water rights,
"the court shall not make a determination as 
to whether public trust
values are associated with any or all 
of the river system or source."
181
The state supreme court invalidated the provision, 
stating that the
public trust doctrine in Arizona is a constitutional 
limitation on legis-
lative power to give away resources held in trust 
for the public. 8 2 The
court went on to state that it was "for the courts 
to decide whether the
public trust is applicable to the facts" and that 
the legislature cannot
by statute destroy the constitutional limitations 
on its authority.181
These cases all show courts utilizing common law, 
state constitu-
tional law, and state statutes to support a critical 
review of state action
that has the potential to interfere with public 
trust principles. As
such, the analysis contained in these cases is quite 
different from that
found in the opinions issued in the 1970s, such 
as Just v. Marinette
County' 4 and Marks v. Whitney.
185 In those cases, the courts had little
to draw upon at a doctrinal level other than 
a vague idea of public
trust principles and belief that the courts can and 
should play a role in
natural resources protection
.8 6
By contrast, a review of the more recent 
cases shows that courts
have more to work with since the environmental 
movement of the
1970s, which brought with it state constitutional 
provisions and stat-
utes containing strong policy statements with 
regard to protection of
natural resources for future generations.
1 8 7 As a result, these in-
creased statements of authority and policy 
statements provide substan-
tive content to public trust principles and 
at least a partial response to
those who would criticize close judicial review of legislative 
action. In-
deed, Sax himself acknowledged that "public 
trust law is not so much
a substantive set of standards" as it is a technique 
for courts to mend
180 972 P.2d 179 (Ariz. 1999).
181 Id. at 199 (citing ARiz. REV. SrAT. ANN. § 45-263(B) 
(2003)).
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
185 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971).
186 Id. at 378-79; Just, 201 N.W.2d at 768-69.
187 See supra Part I.A.
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"perceived imperfections" in the legislative and administrative
process.11 8
The need for the increased authority courts are 
amassing from
various sources is just as great in cases where the state is attempting 
to
protect natural resources in the face of private 
property claims. As
shown below, courts in this second category of 
cases use techniques
similar to the cases in the first category, resulting 
in a stronger and
more comprehensive legal foundation to protect 
natural resources
and the environment.
B. Judicial Use of Public Trust Principles to Defend State or Local
Governmental Action
The cases that follow show courts invoking a 
combination of au-
thority related to protection of natural resources 
and the environment
to support state actions to protect those resources 
in the face of com-
peting private property claims. In doing so, courts 
are utilizing public
trust principles to address modern problems without 
being limited by
the various forms in which these principles 
are found. Thus, courts
are relying on the common law doctrine but 
infusing it with policies
and standards contained in more contemporary 
environmental legis-
lation or state constitutional provisions. As shown 
below, courts have
used these mutually-reinforcing methods to 
reject attempts to invali-
date government environmental protection efforts 
and also to reject
takings claims.
1. Public Trust Principles in Support of Government 
Action
In several recent cases, courts have drawn upon 
multiple sources
of public trust principles to support governmental 
efforts to protect
natural resources or the environment. For instance, 
in 2005, the Lou-
isiana Court of Appeals relied on the Save Ourselves 
decision discussed
above'8 9 to hold that a state agency decision 
to lower lake levels to
reduce organic matter and improve the lake's 
ecology was supported
by the public trust doctrine.'
90 In response to allegations that the pro-
posed action would interfere with property 
rights by adversely im-
pacting commercial marinas, the court found 
that the state's action
was consistent with the public trust doctrine 
and its manifestation in
the state's constitution.'
91 The court recognized that "[e]nviron-
188 See Sax, supra note 5, at 509, 521.
189 See supra notes 165-69 and accompanying 
text.
190 Lake Bistineau Pres. Soc'y, Inc. v. Wildlife & Fisheries 
Comm'n, 895 So. 2d 821,
827 (La. Ct. App. 2005), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1044 (2005).
191 Id.
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mental amenities will often be in conflict with economic and social
considerations,"192 but that under the public trust doctrine, the
agency has an obligation to protect the state's environment. 93
In 2000, the Hawaii Supreme Court addressed a challenge to a
decision by the State Commission on Water Resource Management to
amend instream flow standards. 194 As part of its proceedings, the
Commission relied in part on its responsibility under the public trust
doctrine and applied the doctrine to both surface and groundwater
resources. In reviewing the Commission's various standards, the court
provided a detailed history of the public trust doctrine and its applica-
tion in the state. 195 The court then turned to the state water code and
rejected arguments that the code displaced or abrogated public trust
principles. 196 Rather, instead of abolishing the common law public
trust doctrine, "the legislature appears to have engrafted the doctrine
wholesale into the Code."1 97 Finally, the court turned to its own con-
stitution and held that the people of the state had "elevated the public
trust doctrine to the level of a constitutional mandate." Thus, the
court found that the doctrine was a "fundamental principle" of consti-
tutional law in the state.1 98 Moreover, the court held that mere com-
pliance by agencies under the water code is not sufficient to
determine whether their actions comport with the public trust doc-
trine. 99 Instead, "the doctrine continues to inform the Code's inter-
pretation, define its permissible 'outer limits' and justify its
existence ."200
With regard to the scope and purpose of the trust (embodied in
common law, statutory and constitutional form), the court relied on
holdings in California and other states that the purposes and uses of
the trust "have evolved with changing public values and needs."20'
Thus, "the state has both [an] authority and duty to preserve the
rights of present and future generations in the waters of the state,"
192 Id. at 826.
193 Id. at 827; see also Avenal v. State, 886 So. 2d 1085, 1101-02 (La. 2004) (hold-
ing state coastal restoration project that interfered with private oyster leases was not
an unconstitutional taking because state was obligated to protect its coastline re-
sources for present and future generations under the state constitution and the pub-
lic trust doctrine).
194 In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 425-30 (Haw. 2000).
195 Id. at 439-42.
196 Id. at 442-45.
197 Id. at 442.
198 Id. at 444.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 443-45.
201 Id. at 448 (discussing public trust decisions from California and New jersey).
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and must take its duty into account when 
allocating water re-
sources.
20 2 The court held that these trust principles applied 
equally
to both surface water and groundwater, stating that 
"[m]odern sci-
ence and technology have discredited the surface-ground 
dichot-
omy."203 The court went on to reason that in 
determining the scope
of public trust resources, "we see little sense in 
adhering to artificial
distinctions neither recognized by the ancient 
system nor borne out in
the present practical realities of 
this state." 204
Another example of a court relying on all forms 
of public trust
principles to support government action is the 
North Carolina Court
of Appeals' 2005 decision in Parker v. New Hanover 
County.20 5 In that
case, a landowner challenged a special assessment 
for an inlet reloca-
tion project to address coastal erosion and damage. In holding 
the
assessment was not unconstitutional, the court 
relied on the state's
common law, statutory, and constitutional authority 
to protect natural
resources.
206 The court stated first that the public trust doctrine 
ap-
plied to the waters and lands at issue.
2 7 It then shifted focus to the
state's constitutional provision setting forth 
a policy that the state:
conserve and protect its lands and waters for the benefit 
of all its
citizenry . . . and preserve park, recreational, 
and scenic areas, to
control and limit the pollution of our air and water, 
to control ex-
cessive noise, and in every other appropriate way 
to preserve as a
part of the common heritage of this State its forests, 
wetlands, estua-
ries, beaches, historical sites, openlands, 
and places of beauty.
20 8
The court found these policies consistent with 
those in the state's
Coastal Area Management Act, emphasizing 
the value of North Caro-
lina's coastal resources, including its estuaries 
which are "[a] mong the
most biologically productive regions of this 
State and of this na-
tion."209 Thus, the court found that the county 
had authority to levy
the assessments for erosion and other preservation 
purposes. 210 The
court concluded this discussion by stating that 
its constitution, the
public trust doctrine and state statutes all support 
taking "proactive
steps to protect property from hurricanes and other 
storms," and that
the importance of these activities had been "brought 
home particu-
202 Id. at 453.
203 Id. at 447.
204 Id.
205 619 S.E.2d 868 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
206 Id. at 874-76.
207 Id. at 875.
208 Id. (citing N.C. CoNsr. art. XIV, § 5) (emphasis 
omitted).
209 Id. (citing N.C. GEN. S-rAT. § 113A-102(a) (2003)).
210 Id. at 875-76.
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larly keenly by recent hurricanes and their devastating impact along
the Gulf Coast of the United States." 21 1
Likewise, the Washington Supreme Court in 1998 upheld a
county ordinance banning personal watercraft use on all marine wa-
ters and one lake in the county based on both the public trust doc-
trine as well as "the goals of statewide environmental protection
statutes."2 12 Although the plaintiffs argued that the ban interfered
with the public's ability to use the waters and thus violated the public
trust doctrine, the court held that "it would be an odd use of the pub-
lic trust doctrine to sanction an activity that actually harms and dam-
ages the waters and wildlife of this state."2 3 As a result, the court was
able to rely on statewide environmental statutory policy to use the
public trust doctrine to protect natural resources, even if it conflicted
with public access rights that were historically protected under the
doctrine.
Similarly the Virginia Court of Appeals held in 2006 that the
state's marine resources commission was justified in denying a permit
to construct a storage shed on a pier located along a creek based on
public trust principles.2 14 In reaching its decision, the court cited the
applicable state law, which directed the agency to consider preserva-
tion of public trust resources in reviewing applications for permits to
build structures over state owned lands. 215 The court cited not only
the common law doctrine as support for the agency's action, but also
the Virginia Constitution setting forth a policy to protect the state's
"atmosphere, lands, and waters from pollution, impairment or de-
struction, for the benefit, enjoyment and general welfare of the peo-
ple of the Commonwealth."2 16
211 Id.; see also Parks v. Cooper, 676 N.W.2d 823, 835-41 (S.D. 2004) (holding that
lakes newly created in recent years by climate change were subject to public trust
doctrine based on common law doctrine in South Dakota as well as the State's Water
Resources Act which codifies public trust principles and evinces a legislative intent to
allocate and regulate water resources).
212 Weden v. San Juan County, 958 P.2d 273, 283-84 (Wash. 1998).
213 Id. at 284.
214 Palmer v. Commonwealth Marine Res. Comm'n, 628 S.E.2d 84, 90-91 (Va. Ct.
App. 2006).
215 Id. at 89-90.
216 Id. at 89 (citing VA. CONST. art. XI, § 1); see also Evelyn v. Commonwealth, 621
S.E.2d 130, 137 n.3 (Va. Ct. App. 2005) (holding it "entirely appropriate" for the state
environmental agency and judiciary to consider the legislature's express duty to safe-
guard the public right of subaqueous lands held in trust for the benefit of the public
under the common law doctrine and the state constitution in "applying all legislative
enactments").
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2. Public Trust Principles as a Defense Against Takings Claims
Courts in many jurisdictions have relied upon public trust princi-
ples to support state environmental regulations in the face of constitu-
tional takings claims. As students and scholars of property and land
use well know, regulatory takings is a "hot" issue these days, with sev-
eral Supreme Court decisions in a short period of time and significant
commentary.21 7 However, the use of public trust principles as a coun-
terbalance to takings claims for public interest purposes has a strong
history going all the way back to Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinios218
and continuing up to the present. As a result there is strong prece-
dent for courts to use public trust principles to promote protection of
natural resources without running afoul of takings claims that would
cripple environmental protection efforts.
For instance, in Illinois Central, the issue over whether Illinois had
the power to convey the land under Lake Michigan to the railroad was
really a question of whether, once the state conveyed the land, it had
to proceed by eminent domain to get it back, or whether it could sim-
ply invalidate the original conveyance. That is precisely how Justice
Shiras in his dissenting opinion saw the issue. In his opinion, Justice
Shiras reviewed the contract conveying the land to the railroad and
found that the contract conveyed the ownership of land but prevented
the railroad from impairing public rights of navigation or obstructing
the harbor in any way.21 9 As a result, Justice Shiras posited that there
was no impairment of any public trust rights until and unless the rail-
road attempted to infringe upon those limitations contained in the
initial grant.22 0 In the meantime, if Illinois wanted to take back the
217 See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 336-37 (2002) (imposing a moratorium on development as part of land use
planning was not a per se taking); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 634-35
(2001) (permitting a property owner to challenge development restrictions on water-
front property even if restrictions predate his ownership); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Coun-
cil, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-30 (1992) (holding state coastal zone management act that
prevented all development of beachfront property was a taking unless background,
common law principles of property and nuisance would have prevented the develop-
ment); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of L.A., 482
U.S. 304, 318-21 (1987) (holding that if a government regulation results in a taking,
the government must pay just compensation from the time the regulation is enacted
until it is rescinded); see also ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VicKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CON-
TROLS 178, 184-85, 193 (3d ed. 2005) (discussing recent scholarly commentary on
regulatory takings).
218 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
219 Id. at 469-73 (Shiras, J., dissenting).
220 Id. at 474.
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lands it had granted, it could do so only "by a constitutional condem-
nation of them."221
The majority, of course, rejected this analysis, holding instead
that the public trust prevented the conveyance of land in the first
place.222 On the takings issue, the Court found that the arguments on
those issues were "not parallel" to the current case.22 3 Instead, the
Court stated simply that common law and public policy applied a dif-
ferent source of law when the issue was lands under navigable waters
historically held in trust for the public.224 Thus, Illinois Central itself
embraced the concept that public trust principles were historic com-
mon law limitations on the ability of private parties to develop public
trust lands.
This idea of the public trust as a background limitation on private
property rights continues through the Wisconsin Supreme Court's de-
cision in Just v. Marinette County225 in 1972 and California Supreme
Court decisions from the early 1900s into the 1980s. 226 In Just, the
landowners argued that government regulations restricting them
from filling the wetlands on their property required payment of just
compensation.22 7 In rejecting that argument, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court held that public trust principles not only required the state to
promote navigation but also protect and preserve waters for fishing,
recreation, and scenic beauty.228 As a result, based on public trust
principles, a landowner has "no absolute and unlimited right to
change the essential natural character of his land" or use it for a pur-
pose "unsuited to its natural state and which injures the rights of
others."229
Likewise, the California Supreme Court several times expressly
rejected claims that exercise of the public trust to prevent develop-
ment of private property constituted a taking of property which re-
quired just compensation. These cases arose in situations where the
state sought to improve navigation and ta!ke other actions to promote
the public trust in private tidelands,230 where the state sought to limit
the development of tidelands that had been sold to private parties
221 Id.
222 Id. at 452-53.
223 Id. at 455-58.
224 Id. at 457-58.
225 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
226 See infra notes 230-34 and accompanying text.
227 Just, 201 N.W.2d at 767.
228 Id. at 768.
229 Id.
230 See People v. Cal. Fish Co., 138 P. 79, 87-88 (Cal. 1913).
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many years prior,2 3I and where nonprofit groups challenged the con-
tinuation of prior appropriated water diversions from inland streams
that would impact natural resources in navigable waters.2 32 In the last
case, the "Mono Lake" decision discussed supra in Part I.A., the su-
preme court summarized its precedent in this area as being based on
Illinois Central, which "remains the primary authority even today, al-
most nine decades after it was decided."233 Based on that authority,
the court confirmed that use of public trust principles did not consti-
tute a taking of property, even where the lands had long been thought
free of any interference or restriction from the public trust.234 Thus,
Illinois Central and various state court decisions show the public trust
as a long-standing common law principle limiting private develop-
ment without resulting in a constitutional taking requiring just
compensation.
More recently, historic common law doctrines such as the public
trust doctrine have played a central role in the regulatory takings de-
bate as a result of the Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council.235 In Lucas, the issue was whether the state's
beachfront management act restricting development of coastal areas
was a taking of private property. The Court, in an opinion by Justice
Scalia, announced what appeared to be a new "per se" rule of regula-
tory takings. Under this new rule, if the government denies all eco-
nomic use of property (i.e., a complete "wipe-out"), the action is a
taking of private property that must be compensated under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution unless "back-
ground principles" of state nuisance and property law would have pre-
cluded the development in question. 2 6 As a result, since 1992, courts
and scholars have grappled with which state laws constitute the sort of
"background principles" sufficient to prevent an unconstitutional tak-
ing of private property.23 v Not surprisingly, one background principle
of property law courts have looked to is the longstanding public trust
doctrine, which predates the existence of the United States itself and
231 City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362, 363-64 (Cal. 1980).
232 Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983).
233 Id. at 721 (quoting City of Berkeley, 606 P.2d at 365).
234 Id. at 723-24.
235 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
236 See id. at 1028-32.
237 See, e.g., Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 38, at 331-54 (discussing Lucas and argu-
ing that courts have expansively interpreted the "background principles" of nuisance
and property law which foreclose a claim for compensation under the takings clause).
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has been used as a defense to takings cases as far back as Illinois
Central.2 38
For instance, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in
2002 that a city's denial of a shoreline development permit applica-
tion was not a taking based on the "background principles" of Wash-
ington law which restricted the type of development at issue.239 The
court stated that the public trust doctrine had always existed in Wash-
ington, and the doctrine was also reflected in the state's Shoreline
Management Act.2 40 The court found that the Shoreline Manage-
ment Act was made necessary after a long history of sale of tidelands
and shoreland resulted in the privatization of a vast majority of these
lands, and unrestricted construction was not in the public interest.24t
Thus, because development in the tideland areas at issue would have
interfered with public trust uses, the development plans were never a
legally permissible use and the restriction of such development was
not a taking.242 Here, instead of relying on the more amorphous
common law public trust doctrine, the court used the common law
doctrine as a base but used the more specific policy directives in the
state's Shoreline Management Act to provide standards to flesh out
public trust principles.
Likewise, the New York Supreme Court in 1998 upheld the con-
stitutionality of a state law restricting development in an area of Long
Island in large part because of the important principles of the public
trust doctrine, provisions of the New York Constitution and "the as-
sumption that the conservation of resources is intrinsically good and
necessary for the continuance of society."243 Finally, the Rhode Island
Superior Court in 2005, in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,244 found that the
state's denial of a permit to fill eighteen acres of salt marsh was not a
taking, after the U.S. Supreme Court had remanded the case for a
takings analysis.2 45 The court described the tidal pond adjoining the
salt marsh as a "particularly fragile ecosystem," and the salt marsh it-
self as a "valuable filtering system" for runoff and pollutants, and inte-
238 See id. at 341-44 (discussing courts' recent use of public trust doctrine to deny
takings claims under Lucas). But see Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of
Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1433,
1438-39 (1993) (suggesting that Lucas may be viewed as a rejection of the ecological
worldview expressed in Just v. Marinette County).
239 Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2002).
240 Id. at 985-86.
241 Id.
242 Id. at 986-87.
243 W.J.F. Realty Corp. v. State, 672 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998).
244 No. WM 88-0297, 2005 WL 1645974 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 5, 2005).
245 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
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gral and necessary to wildlife habitat.2 46 In rejecting the takings
claim, the lower court held the plaintiffs proposal to fill the salt
marsh would constitute a nuisance and was also limited by the state
public trust doctrine, which was incorporated into the state's constitu-
tion.2 4 7 Indeed, the court cited prior Rhode Island case law stating
that any system of regulation of tidal land in the state must be viewed
in the context of the public trust doctrine.2 48
These more recent cases show courts following in the tradition of
Illinois Central and Just with regard to regulatory takings cases, but us-
ing a more structured and mutually reinforcing approach to public
trust principles. In these cases, the courts are drawing on well-
founded background principles of property law in the form of the
public trust doctrine, but giving these principles new life and stan-
dards by integrating the new policies and legal standards to protect
natural resources created since the 1970s. Such an approach is not
only consistent with Illinois Central but is also consistent with Lucas's
requirement that modern day environmental protection regulations
be based on background principles of property law to avoid takings
claims in complete "wipe-out" situations.
III. CREATING A MODERN FRAMEWORK TO PROTECT
NATURAL RESOURCES
So we see in Part II that there is a trend among at least a small
group of courts in recent years to integrate the common law public
trust doctrine, state constitutional environmental protection provi-
sions, and state statutes to protect natural resources and the environ-
ment as a matter of state law. What does this trend mean and why is it
important? Why are we seeing more of this since the 1990s than in
prior years when environmental statutes and constitutional provisions
have been around since the 1970s? The remainder of this Article at-
tempts to address these questions.
A. Utilizing Public Trust Principles in Conjunction with Constitutional,
Statutory and Regulatory Policy
First, the new federal and state environmental statutes of the
1970s and 1980s brought with them the creation of expert agencies
and funding for vast numbers of studies and data collection opportu-
nities in areas of air pollution, water pollution, toxic substances,
246 Palazzolo, 2005 WL 1645974, at *3.
247 Id. at *5-7 (citing R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 17).
248 Id. at *7 (citing Champlin's Realty Assocs. v. Tillson, 823 A.2d 1162, 1165 (R.I.
2003); Town of Warren v. Thornton-Whitehouse, 740 A.2d 1255, 1259 (R.I. 1999)).
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remediation and pollution control techniques. Richard 
Revesz has
documented how this growth in expertise has resulted 
in a marked
increase in the competence and experience of state 
and local environ-
mental officials who establish and implement state 
statutory and regu-
latory policy.
249
There is no reason these statutory standards and 
policies cannot
be used to inform development of state public 
trust principles and the
decisions cited in earlier Parts show courts doing 
so. This trend goes
well beyond public trust developments and has 
permeated related ar-
eas such as tort claims seeking relief for environmental 
harm. For
instance, since the explosion of federal and state 
environmental stat-
utes beginning in the 1970s, courts have used 
a growing number of
statutory and regulatory standards to develop their 
state common law
of tort on issues of liability, damages, and injunctive relief in 
cases
involving environmental harm. These judicial techniques 
find sup-
port in the proposed final draft of the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts
on the topic of "Statutory Violations as Negligence 
Per Se," which
states that an actor is negligent if he or she violates 
a statute "designed
to protect against the type of accident the actor's 
conduct causes and
if the victim is within the class of persons the 
statute is designed to
protect. '25 0 Thus, if a plaintiff meets these requirements 
she may re-
cover damages or obtain an injunction for violation of a federal, 
state
or local statute or ordinance
251 under the doctrine of negligence per
se even if the statute itself does not provide 
a private right of action.
252
These same principles apply to claims for nuisance, 
often cited as the
foundation for modern environmental law, which 
also can be based
on statutory or regulatory violations.
25 3
249 Revesz, supra note 111, at 626-30.
250 RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR 
PHYSICAL HARM § 14 (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
251 See id. cmt. a (stating that the section applies equally 
to "regulations adopted
by state administrative bodies, ordinances adopted 
by local councils, and federal stat-
utes as well as regulations promulgated by federal 
administrative agencies").
252 Id. cmt. b.
253 WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW 
OF PROPERTY 415 (3d ed.
2000) (noting that violation of a statute is one way to 
establish a nuisance); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A cmt. e (1979) (stating, 
in a section entitied
"Tort Liability for Violation of Legislative Provision," 
that at common law, violations
of statutes and regulations can be used to establish 
both negligence per se and nui-
sance). At common law, a "public nuisance" is any activity 
that involves an "unreason-
able interference with a right common to the general 
public." Id. § 821B. Conduct is
deemed "unreasonable" if (1) it involves a significant 
interference with public health,
safety, public peace, public comfort or public 
convenience, or (2) it is prohibited by
statute, ordinance or administration regulation, 
or (3) it is of a continuing nature or
74 4 -. . . . . .... E. .v ...
Courts have used statutory standards to develop 
the common law
in areas beyond establishing liability for negligence 
and nuisance. In-
deed, courts have regularly used statutory policies 
and standards in
recent years to inform the common law 
in environmental cases
through expansive interpretations of common 
law strict liability for
environmental harm25
4 and the growing concept of "stigma damages"
for contaminated property under common law 
tort claims.2 55 Both of
these developments can be tied to the enactment 
in 1980 of the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation 
and Liability Act
(CERCIA),256 which revolutionized how the government 
and the
public deal with contaminated property.
25 7 The same analysis can be
applied to public trust principles, which can 
and should evolve with
statutory and constitutional developments that 
supply necessary stan-
dards and policies to address today's 
natural resources issues.
258
Certainly the common law public trust doctrine 
in many states is
narrower in scope than general doctrines 
of negligence, nuisance,
and strict liability. However, it remains a doctrine 
that has developed
with changing societal needs, and, like other common 
law doctrines,
can look to policy statements and standards 
contained in state consti-
tutions and environmental statutes. What 
courts using a mutually-
reinforcing approach to public trust principles 
are doing is really no
different from what courts have been doing 
for years in the context of
negligence per se and nuisance per se.
As stated earlier, the common law public 
trust doctrine cannot
and should not substitute for strong federal 
and state legislation and
regulation, which can control pollution more 
broadly without many of
has produced a permanent, long-lasting effect 
and the actor knows or has reason to
know the conduct has a significant effect on 
a public right. See id. § 821B(2). A pri-
vate nuisance is action that is (1) intentional and unreasonable 
or (2) unintentional
and otherwise negligent, reckless or based 
on conduct that is abnormally dangerous.
See id. §§ 821D, 822.
254 See Klass, supra note 154, at 939-61 (documenting 
a trend among courts to
impose common law strict liability in cases 
involving environmental contamination
because of the influence of CERCLA).
255 See Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and 
Federalism in the Age of the Regulatory
State, 92 IowA L. REv. (forthcoming 2007).
256 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000).
257 See Klass, supra note 255 (manuscript at 34).
258 Indian law provides a non-environmental 
law example where courts have cre-
ated a framework in which statutes and non-statutory 
doctrines are mutually reinforc-
ing. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax 
Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973) ("The
Indian sovereignty doctrine is relevant, then, 
not because it provides a definitive reso-
lution of the issues in this suit, but because 
it provides a backdrop against which the
applicable treaties and federal statutes must 
be read.").
[VOL. 82:2TREvo D AME LAW REVIEW
2o006 MODERN PUBLIC TRUST PRINCIPLES 
745
the scope limitations inherent in the public trust doctrine. 
However,
by integrating constitutional, statutory and regulatory 
standards into
the public trust law of any particular state, the doctrine 
can work side
by side with the statutory and regulatory framework 
to provide incen-
tives to protect natural resources and the environment.
This is particularly true in states that historically 
have not had a
strong common law public trust doctrine or do 
not have an environ-
mental rights statute. First, Illinois Central arguably 
imposes at least
minimal public trust obligations on all states
259 and, more recently,
the Supreme Court has held that the scope of the 
doctrine is a function
of state law. 2 60 Thus, courts in jurisdictions that have not as 
of yet
relied on the public trust doctrine for environmental 
protection pur-
poses can and should develop their common 
law doctrine to protect
resources based on standards and policy statements 
in the numerous
federal and state environmental statutes and regulations 
placing a pre-
mium on environmental protection. Whether 
or not those statutes
have private rights of action is irrelevant; following 
the development
of the doctrines of negligence per se and nuisance 
per se, the public
trust doctrine can be a vehicle for enforcing these 
statutory and regu-
latory standards. Indeed, there is a rich history 
of legal theory and
Supreme Court precedent supporting the idea 
that statutes should in-
form the common law, just as common law has always 
informed
statutes.
2 6 1
259 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 
452-54 (1892) (finding that states
are not authorized to abdicate control over trust 
lands); see also Wilkinson, supra note
11, at 453-55 (stating that the parties were arguing principles 
of general applicability,
not just Illinois law, and that the opinion leaves "little doubt that 
the Court conceived
of a general trust that applied to all states"); supra notes 
24-30 and accompanying
text (discussing the potential interplay between Illinois Central 
and the Erie doctrine).
260 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 
U.S. 469, 475 (1988) (recognizing the
longstanding rule that "individual States have the 
authority to define the limits of the
lands held in public trust and to recognize private 
rights in such lands as they see
fit").
261 See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 
398 U.S. 375, 392 (1970) ("It has
always been the duty of the common-law court 
to perceive the impact of major legisla-
tive innovations and to interweave the new legislative 
policies with the inherited body
of common-law principles-many of them 
deriving from earlier legislative exer-
tions."); James McCauley Landis, Statutes and the Sources 
of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL
ESSAYS 213, 230 (1934) (arguing that common law courts should 
look to the legislative
process to "strike a more favorable balance between 
legislative and judicial develop-
ment of the law"); Frank E. Horack, Jr., The Common Law of Legislation, 
23 IowA L. REv.
41, 54 (1937) (arguing that courts should "use the statutory 
development as a guide
in determining shifting social policy and shifting 
administrative demands"); see also
GUIDO CALABRESi, A COMMON LAW FOR TE AGE 
OF STATUTES 81-92 (1982) (citing
Landis and taking his position one step further to 
argue that courts should be able to
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B. A Contemporary Response to the Critics
Viewing public trust principles in this more holistic and mutually-
reinforcing manner addresses many of the criticisms lodged against
the doctrine. First, scholars have criticized the doctrine for relying on
a property-based paradigm of natural resources protection that has
foreclosed a more ecological or holistic vision of our relationship with
the environment. 262 These critics argue that the nation was poised to
rethink the importance of private property rights in a radical and pro-
gressive way, rendering the public trust doctrine an anachronism. 263
However, as is shown in the judicial decisions described in the
prior Parts of this Article, when courts rely on broad state constitu-
tional environmental provisions or policy statements in environmental
protection statutes in discussing public trust principles, the rhetoric
conveys a strong sense of the need for an ecology-based approach to
resource protection, and often recognizes the close relationship be-
tween humans and their environment.2 64 Moreover, while a revolu-
tion in favor of ecological protection over property rights may have
seemed to be a potential trend in the 1980s or early 1990s when these
arguments were made, the trend appears to be much the opposite
now. One manifestation of this reversal can be seen in the Supreme
Court's 1992 decision in Lucas,2 65 which Sax saw as a rejection of an
"ecological worldview" challenge to private property rights.2 66 In-
exercise their common law powers over statutes by revising statutes where appropriate
or forcing legislatures to act, rather than being limited to interpreting existing statu-
tory language or invalidating statutes based on constitutional grounds); WILLIAM N.
ESKRuDCE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 570-92 (3d ed. 2001)
(presenting Moragne and the Landis and Calabresi proposals in the context of discuss-
ing statutes as a source of policy norms); Klass, supra note 255 (manuscript at 17-28)
(tracing the theoretical basis for developing environmental common law against the
backdrop of existing federal and state environmental statutes).
262 See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 1, at 1213-18.
263 See id. at 1214 (stating that one problem with the public trust approach "is that
the model is inherently antagonistic to the promotion of innovative environmental
thought"); Lazarus, supra note 2, at 633 (stating that the trends in the late 1970s and
early 1980s have eroded traditional concepts of private property rights in natural re-
sources and the public trust doctrine has obscured analysis and has made more diffi-
cult the process of reworking natural resources law in light of these trends).
264 See Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971); Avenal v. State, 886 So. 2d
1085, 1101-02 (La. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1049 (2005); W.J.F. Realty Corp. v.
State, 672 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1011-12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998); Just v. Marinette County, 201
N.W.2d 761, 768-69 (Wis. 1972); supra Part I.A.
265 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
266 See Sax, supra note 238, at 1439 ("The Court correctly perceives that an ecolog-
ical worldview presents a fundamental challenge to established property ights, but
the Court incorrectly rejects the challenge.").
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deed, in recent years, we seem to be in the midst 
of a property rights
revolution as bipartisan in some areas of the country 
as the earlier
bipartisan push for environmental 
regulation in the 1970s.
2 67
One very recent example of this trend is the overwhelming 
legis-
lative response to the Supreme Court's 2005 
approval of economic
development takings in Kelo v. City of New London.
268 Although the
decision can be seen as merely reaffirming the 
Court's earlier expan-
sive interpretation of the "public use" clause of 
the Fifth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution,
269 as of April 2006, forty-five states had pro-
posed legislation, constitutional amendments, 
or ballot initiatives
aimed at restricting the use of eminent domain 
for the purpose of
economic development.
270 Legislation in many of these states has
passed, radically changing the ability of governments 
to take private
property for public use projects if they involve 
private actors 271
Likewise, state ballot initiatives like Measure 37 
in Oregon requir-
ing state and local governments to compensate 
landowners for most
environmental or land use regulations that diminish 
the value of their
properties show a general distrust of government 
regulation in the
267 See, e.g., JEssE DuKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 
1024 (6th ed. 2006) (discussing
contemporary property rights movement and legislative 
and executive branch activity
at the federal and state levels to provide greater 
protection for private property
rights); ELLICESON & BEEN, supra note 217, at 274-79 
(same).
268 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
269 U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("iNior shall private 
property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.").
270 See Castle Coalition, State Legislative Actions, 
http://maps.castlecoalition.org/
legislation.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2006) [hereinafter 
Castle Coalition] (listing
states with pending and enacted legislation); see also John 
M. Broder, States Curbing
Right to Seize Private Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 
2006, at Al (noting the unanimity of
the response against Kelo); Steven Greenhut, Op-Ed., 
Cross Country: The Anti-Kelo,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2006, at Al5 (stating that Kelo "incited 
a national property-rights
mutiny"); Terry Pristin, Developers Can't Imagine a World Without 
Eminent Domain, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2006, at C5 (stating that outcry against the 
Kelo decision has "given
heart" to property-rights advocates and that even 
city planners and developers "have
been loath to speak up").
271 See Castle Coalition, supra note 270. Recently, 
Richard Epstein has argued that
the "public use" issues in Kelo and other Fifth 
Amendment cases are related to the
public trust doctrine cases in that both types 
of cases require answering the following
question: "Is the transaction just a giveaway to a private party, 
or is there some just
compensation to the state which gives it an appropriate 
public purpose?" Richard A.
Epstein, The Public Use, Public Trust & Public 
Benefit, 9 GRJEEN BAG 2D 125, 131 (2006).
Epstein argues that both types of cases should be 
subject to the same standard which
scrutinizes public purpose in takings cases more 
closely than was done in Kelo, and
also considers more carefully whether conveyances 
of public trust land might have
large components of public value that constitute 
just compensation for the public at
large. Id. at 126-29.
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public interest and more protection of private property rights.2 72 The
Oregon Supreme Court recently held that Measure 37 was constitu-
tional,273 and voters considered similar ballot initiatives in 2006 in Ari-
zona, California, Idaho, and Washington.27 4 These trends do not
mean that environmentalists should despair of ever reaching a point
in this country where there would be a real revolution in conceptions
of humanity's relationship with the environment. That day may still
come. But it may not come soon, and in the interim, public trust
principles allow the courts to participate appropriately in the law of
natural resources protection particularly during times where legisla-
tive efforts are not a driving force in this area.
Another criticism of the common law public trust doctrine, ex-
pressed most forcefully by Richard Lazarus, is that it draws attention
away from the enactment of strong environmental legislation, which is
a more comprehensive and democratic method of protecting natural
resources.275 However, the thesis set forth in this Article is that com-
mon law public trust principles and strong environmental legislation
are not an "either-or" proposition. With the approach set out here,
strong environmental legislation is crucial to providing policy direc-
tion and standards to the development of new public trust principles.
In this way, the public trust doctrine can provide the vehicle for state
judicial review in cases where the statute does not provide its own
right of action.2 76
272 See State of Or., Voter's Pamphlet 103-04 (2004), available at http://www.sos.
state.or.us/elections/nov22004/guide/pdf/vpvoll.pdf; Symposium, Ballot Measure
37: The Redrafting of Oregon's Landscape, 36 ENVTL. L. 1 (2006) (discussing ramifica-
tions of Measure 37); Editorial, The Anti-Kelo Case, WALL. ST. J., Feb. 23, 2006, at A16
(reporting on Measure 37 and expressing hope that laws like Measure 37 and legisla-
tive responses to the Kelo decision "may well inspire more Americans to continue
defending that most basic of Constitutional rights: owning property").
273 See MacPherson v. Dep't of Admin. Servs., 130 P.3d 308, 311-12 (Or. 2006)
(upholding the constitutionality of Measure 37).
274 See, e.g., Nat'l Conf. of State Legislatures, Property Rights Issues on the 2006
Ballot, www.ncsl.org/statevote/prop-rights-06.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2006) (initia-
tive passed in Arizona and failed in remaining states); Am. Planning Ass'n, Eminent
Domain Legislation Across America, http://www.planning.org/legislation/measure
37/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2006).
275 See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 2, at 712-13.
276 For instance, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),
7 U.S.C.A. §§ 13 6-1 3 6y (2000 & West Supp. 2006), does not allow private parties to
sue for violation of statutory provisions, leaving plaintiffs to resort to common law
claims for injunctive relief or damages. See, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544
U.S. 431, 448 (2005) (indicating that FIFRA does not provide a federal remedy for
persons injured as a result of a manufacturer's violation of FIFRA's labeling require-
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Moreover, it does not appear that the public trust doctrine 
had
any detrimental impact on the development of federal 
and state statu-
tory environmental and regulatory law in earlier 
years. Congress and
the states created the massive statutory and regulatory 
framework that
currently exists for environmental protection 
at precisely the same
time that the modern public trust 
doctrine was also on the rise.
27 7
Indeed, if anything, Sax's revitalization of the 
common law public
trust doctrine had an extremely positive impact 
on the shaping of fed-
eral environmental law through the emphasis 
on citizen suit provi-
sions and the focus on protection of endangered 
species and other
environmental resources for the benefit of 
the public and future
generations.2
78
Despite these early potential synergies, state 
common law has
been little more than a sideline for scholars and 
students of environ-
mental law since the creation of the federal environmental 
regulatory
system.2 79 However, today we find ourselves 
in an era where there is
significant public concern over the failure of 
the federal executive
and legislative branches to take strong action 
on today's environmen-
tal challenges, whether they are automobile emissions, 
global warm-
ing, water pollution, or regulation of toxic substances.
280 Much of this
ments); No Spray Coal., Inc. v. City of New York, 351 
F.3d 602, 605 (2d Cir. 2003)
(discussing the absence of a private right of action in FIFRA).
277 See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 109, at 88-90 
(providing chronology of signifi-
cant federal environmental legislation).
278 See, e.g., PLATER ET AL., supra note 37, at 
1066 (noting that "public trust con-
cepts can be found in the protection of endangered 
species, prevention of significant
deterioration (PSD) in air quality far cleaner than necessary 
for health, restoration of
mined lands despite low locational values, safeguards 
for groundwater purity even
where no one uses the groundwater resource, 
and so on"); see also SAx, supra note 9,
at 173-74 (stating that implementation of public trust 
as a public right will, among
other things, force consideration of alternatives 
that might harm the environment,
recognize legitimacy of public rights and help 
create "an effective body of environ-
ment law").
279 See, e.g., PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 109, 
at 103 (noting that common law in
the environmental area remains important for 
compensation purposes but the more
innovative environmental protection measures 
are the product of state regulation);
id. at 75 (stating there is "wide agreement" that private nuisance 
actions alone are
insufficient to resolve more typical pollution problems); PLATER ET 
AL., supra note 37,
at 283-84 (citing various limitations of common law in 
addressing environmental
problems).
280 See, e.g., Francis X. Clines, Judge Takes on the 
White House on Mountaintop Mining,
N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2002, § 1, at 18 (discussing a lawsuit 
over the ability of mining
companies to engage in "mountaintop mining," 
blasting mountaintop rock and de-
positing it into nearby streams, and the Bush 
administration's rule change to allow
such practices); Christopher Drew & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., 
How Power Lobby Won Battle
of Pollution Control at E.P.A., N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 6, 2004, at Al 
(discussing the Bush ad-
750 .. AEA EE..8
concern is expressed by state and local governments who 
have taken
matters into their own hands to attempt to fill what they 
see as a "void"
left by inadequate federal regulations and inadequate 
enforcement of
existing regulations .2s l State efforts to rely on state 
common law to fill
this void are most obvious in the area of global warming, 
where some
states are looking to common law nuisance claims 
to address green-
house gas emissions in the face of the federal government's 
refusal to
regulate strongly in this area. For instance, in 2006, 
North Carolina
filed a lawsuit against the Tennessee Valley Authority 
claiming green-
house gas emissions from plants owned by the federal 
power authority
in several states were harming North Carolina citizens 
and the state's
ministration's dismissal of Clean Air Act lawsuits against 
power plants initiated during
the Clinton administration and departures within 
the EPA); Douglas Jehl, E.P.A. to
Abandon New Arsenic Limits for Water Supply, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 21, 2001, at Al (discuss-
ing Bush administration's withdrawal of new 
arsenic standards enacted during Clin-
ton administration to protect drinking water); Editorial, 
Mr. Bush Reverses Course, N.Y.
TIMES, March 15, 2001, at A24 (criticizing President Bush's 
decision not to regulate
emissions of carbon dioxide despite a campaign 
promise to the contrary); Richard A.
Oppel,Jr. & Christopher Drew, States Planning 
Own Lawsuits Over Pollution, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 9, 2003, at Al (discussing proposed lawsuits by 
attorneys general of several
northeastern states to sue electric utilities for 
violations of the Clean Air Act after the
EPA dropped its investigations and dismissed 
lawsuits pursuing the utilities); Katha-
rine Q. Seelye, Administration Adapts Rule on Antipollution 
Exemption, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
28, 2003, at A20 (discussing Bush administration's relaxation 
of clean air rules to
allow thousands of industrial plants to make 
upgrades without installing pollution
controls); Katharine Q. Seelye, U.S. Seeks to Limit Environmental 
Law's Reach over Coastal
Waters, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2002, at AIO (discussing the 
Bush administration's new
position that the National Environmental Policy 
Act does not apply to the vast major-
ity of oceans under United States control).
281 See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power 
Co., Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 271-74
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing action by several states against 
midwestern power plants
for failure to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
under federal common law of nui-
sance on "political question" grounds); David R. Hodas, 
State Law Responses to Global
Warming: Is It Constitutional to Think Globally 
and Act Locally?, 21 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
53, 53-59 (2003) (discussing absence of federal leadership 
on the issue of global
warming, federal administration opposition to 
control of greenhouse gases, and state
and local policy initiatives to adopt laws 
and regulations to regulate greenhouse
gases); Symposium, The Role of State Attorneys General in 
National Environmental Policy,
30 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 403, 404 (2005) (containing comments 
by Professor Thomas
McGarity about actions by state or local governments 
to address MTBE contamination
and stating that "
[
a]s the federal agencies have grown more or less moribund, 
one of
the few progressive forces left today is a small 
group of state AG's filing innovative
suits"); Oppel & Drew, supra note 280 (discussing proposed 
lawsuits by attorneys gen-
eral of several northeastern states to sue electric 
utilities for violations of the Clean Air
Act after the EPA dropped its investigations 
and dismissed lawsuits pursuing the
utilities).
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economy.28 2 The suit is being brought under the source states' public
nuisance laws as there is no federal statute available to address green-
house gas emissions. This perceived federal inaction and recent state
responses present the perfect opportunity to seriously consider the
renewed role state public trust principles can play in new environmen-
tal protection efforts.
Moreover, the Supreme Court's "new federalism" revolution in
the 1990s may call into question the ability of federal environmental
statutes to continue to be the driving force to protect the environ-
ment.2813 The Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. Lopez28 4
and United States v. Morrison2 85 put limits on the prior limitless reach
of Congress's authority to regulate under the Commerce Clause. Be-
cause nearly all federal environmental statutes are enacted pursuant
to Commerce Clause authority, blind reliance on the ability of Con-
gress to regulate nationwide to protect natural resources and the envi-
ronment may not be wise. 286 As a result, public trust principles as
implemented by state courts can be developed to be part of the new
and innovative efforts states are undertaking in our federalist system
both as a matter of legislation and of common law.287
282 See Complaint at 1, North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 439 F. Supp. 2d 486
(W.D.N.C. Jan. 30, 2006) (No. 1:06-CV-20); North Carolina Lawsuit Against TVA Alleges
Harm from Power Plant Emissions, 37 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 221 (Feb. 3, 2006).
283 See, e.g., Klass, supra note 255 (manuscript at 17-28) (discussing the impact of
.new federalism" principles on environmental law).
284 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (invalidating the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990
on grounds that it regulated a local activity beyond Congress's reach under the Com-
merce Clause).
285 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (invalidating the Violence Against Women Act hold-
ing that it had too tenuous a relationship to interstate commerce to be within Con-
gress's authority to regulate).
286 For examples of Commerce Clause challenges to federal environmental stat-
utes, see United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 701-02 (4th Cir. 2003) (Clean Water
Act); GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 624-25 (5th Cir. 2003) (Endan-
gered Species Act); Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1064 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (Endangered Species Act); Frier v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 303 F.3d 176, 182
(2d Cir. 2002) (CERCLA); Allied Local & Reg'l Mfrs. Caucus v. EPA, 215 F.3d 61, 66
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (Clean Air Act); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 487-88 (4th Cir.
2000) (Endangered Species Act); Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d
1041, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Endangered Species Act); United States v. Olin Corp.,
107 F.3d 1506, 1508 (11th Cir. 1997) (CERCLA); see also Rapanos v. United States,
126 S. Ct. 2208, 2216-17, 2220-27 (2006) (addressing the Clean Water Act's authority
over intrastate wetlands but deciding the case on statutory rather than constitutional
grounds); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531
U.S. 159, 172-73 (2001) (same).
287 See Michael C. Blumm, Public Property and the Democratization of Western Water
Law: A Modem View of the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 573, 577-78 (1989) (stating
206
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Finally, the public trust doctrine has been subject to criticism by
those who see it as simply another unconstitutional deprivation of pri-
vate property without just compensation. 288 In other words, if the ju-
diciary chooses to apply public trust principles in an expansive way, it
is a taking of private property and just compensation is due. This ar-
gument is based upon the idea that there should be no difference
between state and local regulations that deprive a landowner of her
land's economic use and judicial application of the public trust doc-
trine that deprives a landowner of her land's economic use.289
However, the idea of the public trust doctrine as a limit on pri-
vate property rights is as old as the founding of the nation. This is not
some "new" land grab for environmental protection, but finds its au-
thority starting with Illinois Central290 which certainly predates the cur-
rent debates on regulatory takings.29 1 Moreover, the idea that there is
something fundamentally different between statutes and regulations
restricting land use on the one hand, and common law on the other
has been cemented into federal constitutional law for over ten years.
In Lucas,292Justice Scalia stated that the only defense to a denial of all
beneficial or economic use of land was if the regulation was merely
forbidding uses that would be prohibited by "background principles
of the State's law of property and nuisance."293 As has always been the
case, state common law principles of nuisance and property by defini-
tion expand, and the Court's decision does not expressly state that
state common law doctrines were set in stone at any particular date.
Indeed, Justice Scalia noted in determining whether common law
principles would prevent the use at issue, that "changed circumstances
or new knowledge may make what was previously permissible no
longer so. ' '294 As Michael Blumm and Lucus Ritchie have shown in
their recent article on the topic, courts in various jurisdictions have
that "the public trust doctrine represents a working example of federalism"); Klass,
supra note 255 (manuscript at 17-28) (summarizing various state common law and
legislative efforts to fill the federal void).
288 See, e.g., Huffman, supra note 3, at 533 (arguing that the public trust doctrine is
out of place in a constitutional democracy); James R. Rasband, Equitable Compensation
for Public Trust Takings, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 331, 333 (1998) (stating that compensa-
tion should be provided to private property owners if their property rights are limited
by the public trust doctrine); Thompson, supra note 3, at 1450 (indicating that com-
mon law rules can result in takings in the same manner as regulatory restrictions).
289 See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 3, at 1450-54.
290 111. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
291 See supra notes 218-24 and accompanying text.
292 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
293 Id. at 1029.
294 Id. at 1031.
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applied modern conceptions of nuisance, public trust, the natural use
doctrine, customary rights, water rights, and wildlife trusts to avoid
finding a taking consistent with Lucas.2 15 That these background
principles are now applied in modern ways to modern issues is simply
a function of the development of state common law and does not run
afoul of Lucas or constitutional takings jurisprudence. 296
In the end, state public trust principles will not and should not be
a substitute for strong legislative protection for natural resources and
the environment. Our current regulatory state surely provides far
more protection for natural resources and the environment than the
system in place prior to the 1970s. However, there are many gaps in
the system resulting from lack of enforcement, lack of political will,
lack of resources and a host of other impediments to the enactment
and enforcement of strong environmental protection laws. Public
trust principles as implemented by state courts can play a significant
role in filling those gaps, if scholars expand their view of these princi-
ples and more lawyers and judges follow the lead of the decisions dis-
cussed in Part II. In this way, those in the legal academy and the legal
profession can begin the process of creating a more comprehensive
approach to natural resources protection that relies upon the public
trust doctrine along with statutory and constitutional policies and
standards. Such an approach goes beyond the formalistic distinctions
in the law to see that all these sources of law form a cohesive whole
and, in the process, move the legal doctrine to the next level in ad-
dressing contemporary environmental and natural resource issues.
CONCLUSION
This Article proposes a new framework for using public trust prin-
ciples to protect natural resources and the environment that creates a
mutually-reinforcing relationship between the common law doctrine
and environmental protection provisions contained in state statutes
and constitutions. Such a framework builds on recent developments
in the state courts that can begin to establish a cohesive jurisprudence
of natural resources protection in contrast to prior scholarship that
295 See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 38, at 341-53; see also supra Part II.B.2 (dis-
cussing recent cases in which courts denied takings claims based on the modern appli-
cations of the public trust doctrine).
296 But see Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1212 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). In Stevens, Justice Scalia dissented from a denial of certiorari in an Ore-
gon case denying development rights to owners of certain dry sand beaches because
of the public's interest in those beaches and argued that "[n]o more by judicial de-
cree than by legislative fiat may a State transform private property into public prop-
erty without compensation." Id.
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has assumed an "either-or" dichotomy between the common law and
statutes. Scholars, courts and lawyers can work toward this goal by
reaching out beyond the common law precedent of the doctrine and
incorporating policy statements and standards from the current
codifications of these principles found in state constitutions and stat-
utes. Doing so will strengthen state public trust principles and pro-
vide protection for state natural resources in situations where other
branches of the government cannot or will not act. Moreover, this
process also has the potential to create a new dialogue in the area of
environmental law focusing on principles of ecology and intercon-
nectedness in a way that has been difficult to achieve so far.
